Informations
Référence :
R. Le Boeuf, « La saisine de la Cour internationale de Justice pour faits de guerre », Revue belge de droit international, 2009, pp. 53-77.
Note :
La version en ligne peut légÚrement différer du texte définitif publié dans la revue, qui constitue seule une référence fiable.
Résumé
La Cour internationale de justice est de plus en plus frĂ©quemment saisie de faits en relation avec lâemploi de la force. Il apparaĂźt cependant que la conjonction de ses rĂšgles procĂ©durales et de certaines « lacunes » du droit de la guerre la prive de lâessentiel des rĂšgles applicables aux situations de ce type. Cet Ă©tat du droit contraint les requĂ©rants Ă recourir Ă des instruments juridiques sans rapports avec les faits dont ils souhaitent saisir la Cour, et amĂšne cette derniĂšre Ă se prononcer sur des affaires tronquĂ©es de lâessentiel de leurs caractĂ©ristiques. Il en rĂ©sulte un dĂ©calage de lâintĂ©gralitĂ© du dĂ©bat judiciaire, comme en tĂ©moigne par exemple le diffĂ©rend opposant la GĂ©orgie Ă la Russie.
La saisine de la Cour internationale de Justice pour faits de guerre
Plus de vingt affaires relatives Ă lâemploi de la force ont Ă©tĂ© portĂ©es Ă la connaissance de la Cour internationale de justice depuis son institution1. La requĂȘte gĂ©orgienne du 12 aoĂ»t 2008 constitue le dernier exemple de recours au juge interĂ©tatique dans un contexte dâhostilitĂ©s actives. Si le fait de soumettre un diffĂ©rend de cette nature Ă un rĂšglement judiciaire a pu en son temps soulever un certain nombre de difficultĂ©s2, il est aujourdâhui Ă©tabli que la prĂ©sence « de sĂ©rieux Ă©lĂ©ments dâemploi de la force »3 nâest pas un obstacle Ă la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Cette question, qui a dĂ©jĂ fait lâobjet des rĂ©flexions les plus Ă©clairantes4, nâimpose pas que lâon y revienne. La mise en Ćuvre de cette compĂ©tence rĂ©vĂšle toutefois de la part des Ătats certaines tendances quâil importe de mettre au jour, en ce quâelles participent dâune forme de contournement des rĂšgles de compĂ©tence Ă©tablies par le statut de la juridiction. La saisine5 de la Cour par la GĂ©orgie offre une illustration topique de cette situation. Il convient de rappeler, Ă titre liminaire, que la prĂ©sence de faits de guerre dans un diffĂ©rend soumis Ă la Cour est sans consĂ©quence sur les conditions prĂ©sidant Ă sa saisine : ni la gravitĂ© des faits en cause, ni leur urgence ne nuancent la rigueur procĂ©durale. Ainsi, quand bien mĂȘme la Cour se dĂ©clare « profondĂ©ment prĂ©occupĂ©e par le drame humain, les pertes en vies humaines et les terribles souffrances [âŠ] qui constituent la toile de fond du diffĂ©rend »6, elle ne saurait se passer du consentement des Ătats impliquĂ©s7. LâĂ©tablissement de cette compĂ©tence peut ne soulever que des difficultĂ©s relatives â et communes aux autres types de diffĂ©rends â lorsque le fondement de la saisine est trouvĂ© dans lâarticle 36 § 2 du statut ou dans un agrĂ©ment ad hoc du dĂ©fendeur8. Il en va diffĂ©remment en cas de recours Ă lâarticle 36 § 1, qui exige de lâĂtat demandeur la preuve dâune clause prĂ©voyant spĂ©cialement la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Cet aspect retiendra seul notre attention.
De prime abord, les normes du droit de la guerre semblent Ă cet Ă©gard parfaitement de nature Ă justifier une requĂȘte pour violation devant lâorgane judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. Pourtant, un rapide survol des bases de compĂ©tence invoquĂ©es par les Ătats pour saisir la haute juridiction suffit Ă constater que ces rĂšgles, si elles ont effectivement motivĂ© de nombreuses demandes au fond des Ătats, nâont jamais Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ©es pour fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour au titre de lâarticle 36 § 1. Cet Ă©tat de fait tient simplement Ă ce quâaucun instrument relevant de cette matiĂšre ne comporte de clause compromissoire9. Un Ătat confrontĂ© Ă lâemploi de la force doit par consĂ©quent fonder sa saisine sur des instruments Ă©trangers au corpus du droit de la guerre. Lâensemble du dĂ©bat judiciaire se trouve alors dĂ©portĂ© sur des terrains en dĂ©calage complet avec la nature premiĂšre du diffĂ©rend.
La requĂȘte introduite par la GĂ©orgie relĂšve dâun tel cas de figure. Le requĂ©rant demande Ă la Cour de dire « that the Russian Federation [âŠ] has violated its obligations under CERD10 »11. Le recours Ă une convention dont le but est de lutter contre les discriminations raciales pour fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour dans une affaire essentiellement relative Ă lâemploi de la force suscite lâĂ©tonnement. Quoique la Cour ait finalement retenu sa compĂ©tence prima facie au stade conservatoire de cette affaire12, sept de ses quinze juges se sont dĂ©solidarisĂ©s de la dĂ©cision, estimant :
« pour le moins curieux que la GĂ©orgie, qui fait remonter les prĂ©tendus actes de discrimination raciale qui auraient Ă©tĂ© commis par la Russie, en violation de la CIEDR, depuis le dĂ©but de la dĂ©cennie quatre-vingt-dix, ait attendu le conflit armĂ©, dont elle Ă©tait partie prenante avec la Russie [âŠ] pour saisir immĂ©diatement la Cour dâun diffĂ©rend relatif Ă lâapplication de cette convention »13.
En effet, dĂ©posĂ©e quelques jours seulement aprĂšs le dĂ©but des affrontements de lâĂ©tĂ© 2008, la requĂȘte vise clairement, mĂȘme si elle inclut des Ă©lĂ©ments antĂ©rieurs Ă lâintervention russe, les actes de guerre commis par le dĂ©fendeur. Plus que le contexte, ce sont les demandes formulĂ©es par la GĂ©orgie dans sa requĂȘte qui conduisent Ă voir dans le diffĂ©rend soumis Ă la Cour tout autre chose quâune affaire de discriminations raciales14 : une premiĂšre demande tend Ă la cessation des hostilitĂ©s par la Russie et au retrait de ses troupes15, une autre Ă la non reconnaissance des rĂ©gions sĂ©paratistes dâOssĂ©tie du Sud et dâAbkhazie16, et une troisiĂšme Ă la restauration de lâautoritĂ© gĂ©orgienne sur ces rĂ©gions17. Bien que davantage en cohĂ©rence avec la convention de 1965, les autres demandes prĂ©sentĂ©es paraissent secondaires, et la dĂ©fense russe ne manque pas de dĂ©noncer un « saupoudrage cosmĂ©tique [qui] ne suffit Ă©videmment pas Ă modifier la nature de la requĂȘte »18.
La tentative nâest pas nouvelle. DĂšs 1973, on observe les prĂ©misses dâun dĂ©calage entre les fins poursuivies et les moyens adoptĂ©s dans la requĂȘte dĂ©posĂ©e par le Pakistan contre lâInde. Cette requĂȘte concernait, pour lâessentiel, le sort et le rapatriement de prisonniers de guerre retenus en Inde en dĂ©pit de la cessation des hostilitĂ©s19. La suspension unilatĂ©rale du rapatriement des prisonniers constituait, selon la requĂȘte20, une violation des IIIĂšme et IVĂšme conventions de GenĂšve. Câest pourtant lâarticle IX de la Convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide (ci-aprĂšs convention gĂ©nocide) qui est invoquĂ© pour fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Lâartifice nâĂ©tait dans ce cas que partiel, lâInde ayant justifiĂ© le sort des prisonniers par sa volontĂ© de les faire juger, notamment, pour crimes de gĂ©nocide. Il existait donc bien entre lâInde et le Pakistan un diffĂ©rend relatif Ă lâapplication de la convention sur le gĂ©nocide, et si le diffĂ©rend portant sur la convention gĂ©nocide nâĂ©tait quâaccessoire Ă la question principale du sort des prisonniers de guerre, les deux questions Ă©taient trĂšs Ă©troitement mĂȘlĂ©es, voire finalement indissociables. Dans les affaires ultĂ©rieures, la transposition systĂ©matique des diffĂ©rends relatifs Ă des faits de guerre dans le champ dâautres instruments donnera cependant aux saisines un tour alternativement artificiel ou instrumental.
Constante depuis les premiers pas de la Cour dans le domaine des conflits armĂ©s, cette pratique nâa pas vocation Ă ĂȘtre abandonnĂ©e. Elle constitue en effet pour le requĂ©rant lâultime palliatif de ce qui, de son point de vue, se prĂ©sente comme une lacune conventionnelle. Cet expĂ©dient soulĂšve pourtant de lourdes difficultĂ©s. DifficultĂ©s de principe, dâabord, en ce sens que le procĂ©dĂ© a pour objet de donner compĂ©tence Ă la Cour pour trancher des situations Ă©chappant en principe Ă sa juridiction. DifficultĂ©s dâapplication, ensuite, le discours juridictionnel ne pouvant quâĂȘtre faussĂ© ou tronquĂ©21 par des saisines utilisant des outils inadĂ©quats et nâĂ©clairant que partiellement la vĂ©ritĂ©. Le nombre sans cesse croissant dâaffaires soumises au jugement de la Cour en matiĂšre de faits de guerre impose une Ă©valuation du phĂ©nomĂšne. Surtout, il offre dĂ©sormais un ensemble suffisant pour dresser une esquisse fidĂšle de la pratique des Ătats (I), ainsi que de sa rĂ©ception par la Cour (II).
I. La qualification des faits de guerre dans les requĂȘtes Ă©tatiques
Les Ătats Ă©prouvent une difficultĂ© tangible Ă trouver un instrument, qui, Ă la fois, soit en vigueur entre le demandeur et le dĂ©fendeur, comporte une clause compromissoire, et dont lâobjet soit relatif au diffĂ©rend soumis Ă la Cour. Ă lâĂ©vidence, les deux premiers paramĂštres ne sont pas susceptibles de degrĂ©s. La seule clĂ© exploitable par les demandeurs pour ouvrir la porte du prĂ©toire international est donc celle relative Ă la conformitĂ© de lâobjet du diffĂ©rend Ă celui de la convention visĂ©e. La volontĂ© des Ătats de recourir Ă un organe juridictionnel pour assurer leur intĂ©gritĂ© politique et territoriale les conduit Ă invoquer, pour fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour, un faisceau de conventions hĂ©tĂ©roclites ne prĂ©sentant quâun rapport imparfait avec les caractĂšres rĂ©els du conflit. Il convient donc de sĂ©rier, Ă travers une analyse empirique, les instruments formels mobilisĂ©s jusquâĂ prĂ©sent par les Ătats pour Ă©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour (a). Il deviendra alors possible de confronter ces instruments Ă la rĂ©alitĂ© des mesures attendues par les Ătats (b).
A. La diversité des bases de compétence invoquées
Alors que lâabsence de clauses compromissoires dans les conventions relatives au droit de la guerre devrait entraĂźner une pĂ©nurie dâarguments chez les requĂ©rants, ces derniers nâhĂ©sitent pas, dans leurs requĂȘtes, Ă multiplier les fondements juridiques de leurs actions.
Le droit conventionnel -. Certaines conventions invoquĂ©es ne mĂ©ritent quâune attention Ă©phĂ©mĂšre, ne posant pas de vĂ©ritables difficultĂ©s. Tel est notamment le cas des conventions de rĂšglement judiciaire, câest-Ă -dire des conventions Ă©tablissant entre les parties une acceptation gĂ©nĂ©rale de la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Le pacte de BogotĂĄ, qui prĂ©voyait cette compĂ©tence « in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them »22, a ainsi pu ĂȘtre utilisĂ© dans les affaires opposant le Nicaragua au Honduras23 et au Costa Rica24. Câest le mĂȘme type dâinstrument qui a permis Ă la RFY de complĂ©ter â en vain pour dâautres raisons â les requĂȘtes formĂ©es contre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas en 199925.
La portĂ©e des clauses compromissoires est gĂ©nĂ©ralement beaucoup plus limitĂ©e et, pour paraphraser les formules consacrĂ©es, se limite Ă Ă©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour pour les diffĂ©rends relatifs Ă lâapplication et lâinterprĂ©tation du traitĂ© dans lequel elles sont insĂ©rĂ©es.
Les traitĂ©s dâamitiĂ© ont ainsi fondĂ© Ă deux reprises la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Dans lâaffaire Nicaragua, le demandeur invoquait â outre lâĂąprement contestĂ©e souscription des Ătats-Unis Ă la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour â un traitĂ© dâamitiĂ©, commerce et navigation de 1956, qui prĂ©voyait la compĂ©tence de la Cour internationale en cas de diffĂ©rend relatif Ă son application26. Le traitĂ© dâamitiĂ©, de navigation et de droits consulaires servira identiquement de fondement Ă lâaction de lâIran contre les Ătats-Unis dans lâaffaire des Plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres27.
Dâautres conventions, au spectre beaucoup plus rĂ©duit, ont Ă©galement Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ©es par les Ătats. Bien que ne concernant pas directement les faits de guerre, ces instruments couvrent gĂ©nĂ©ralement des situations qui entretiennent avec de tels faits une proximitĂ© dont les requĂ©rants entendent tirer profit. La Convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide, Ă travers son article IX, est ainsi devenue le pivot de la compĂ©tence de la Cour en matiĂšre de faits de guerre. Ce texte a Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ© par le Pakistan contre lâInde en 1973 pour soutenir des prĂ©tentions en matiĂšre de prisonniers de guerre28, par la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine contre la RFY en 199329, par la RFY contre les Ătats membres de lâOTAN en 199930, par la Croatie contre la RFY31, et enfin par le Congo dans ses requĂȘtes de 1999 et 200232. Seule clause compromissoire spĂ©ciale Ă fonder lâaction de la Cour jusquâĂ rĂ©cemment, lâarticle IX de la convention gĂ©nocide connaĂźt depuis 1999 une concurrence de plus en plus prolifique. La seule prĂ©sence dâune telle clause semble dĂ©sormais suffire Ă lĂ©gitimer dans lâesprit des requĂ©rants lâinvocation dâun traitĂ© pour Ă©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour dans les cas de recours Ă la force, sans considĂ©rations pour son contenu matĂ©riel propre.
Lâinitiateur de cette dĂ©marche fut le Congo33 : incapable de fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour pour les faits commis sur son territoire par le Burundi et le Rwanda sur une autre base que lâillusoire article 38 § 5 du rĂšglement de la Cour, ce demandeur invoqua parallĂšlement les articles 30 et 14 des conventions de New York contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dĂ©gradants de 1984 et de MontrĂ©al pour la rĂ©pression dâactes illicites dirigĂ©s contre la sĂ©curitĂ© de lâaviation civile de 197134. Le phĂ©nomĂšne sâaccentua. Audacieux, il devint caricatural dans la requĂȘte rĂ©introduite contre le Rwanda en 2002. Ce sont alors plus de dix clauses compromissoires qui ont Ă©tĂ© invoquĂ©es simultanĂ©ment. Outre la convention de New York de 1984 et celle de MontrĂ©al de 1971, dĂ©jĂ produites dans le recours de 1999, ce nouveau recours mobilisa la convention relative Ă la discrimination Ă lâĂ©gard des femmes de 1979, celle surlâĂ©limination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale de 1965, celle relative au gĂ©nocide, la constitution de lâOrganisation mondiale de la santĂ© et le statut Unesco35, instruments auxquels furent ajoutĂ©s la convention des Nations Unies sur les privilĂšges et immunitĂ©s des institutions spĂ©cialisĂ©es de 1947 et lâaccord de siĂšge entre la RDC et la MONUCdu 4 mai 200036. La requĂȘte congolaise ne sâarrĂȘta pas lĂ : en vue de complĂ©ter le tableau partiel que son faisceau de traitĂ©s entendait dresser du conflit lâopposant au Rwanda, le Congo ajouta Ă la requĂȘte une longue sĂ©rie de conventions auxquelles son adversaire nâĂ©tait pas mĂȘme partie, mais quâil Ă©tait, selon le demandeur, tenu de respecter en vertu du caractĂšre impĂ©ratif de leur contenu37. Ătaient notamment visĂ©es les conventions internationales et rĂ©gionales de droits de lâhomme ainsi que celles de droit de la guerre38.
Au-delĂ du droit conventionnel ? -. Le jus cogens ne saurait pourtant en lui-mĂȘme comporter dâattribution de juridiction Ă la Cour, et le caractĂšre impĂ©ratif de la norme Ă protĂ©ger nâemporte pas compĂ©tence obligatoire de la Cour39. Afin de justifier son recours aux normes impĂ©ratives devant la juridiction, la RDC invoqua, de maniĂšre assez singuliĂšre, lâarticle 66 de la convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traitĂ©s40. Cet article donne compĂ©tence Ă la Cour pour tout « diffĂ©rend concernant lâapplication ou lâinterprĂ©tation des articles 53 ou 64 » de la convention. Toutefois, si ces deux articles prĂ©sentent un lien indiscutable avec les normes de jus cogens, ils relĂšvent du seul contentieux de la nullitĂ© des traitĂ©s et ne permettent en rien de condamner un Ătat qui violerait, mĂȘme gravement, une norme impĂ©rative41. La tentative du Congo procĂšde dâun dĂ©placement des fonctions reconnues du jus cogens : simple Ă©lĂ©ment de technique contractuelle, cette notion ne peut que dĂ©cevoir ceux qui, la hissant au rang de mythe42, tentent de lâĂ©tendre au-delĂ de ses limites naturelles.
La dĂ©marche du Congo est symptomatique du caractĂšre dĂ©sespĂ©rĂ© de lâaction des demandeurs tenus dâĂ©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour en matiĂšre de faits de guerre. Elle tĂ©moigne de la frustration ressentie par certains Ătats qui, en dĂ©pit dâune protection de leurs droits assurĂ©e par les instruments les plus essentiels du droit international, sâavĂšrent incapables dâen faire sanctionner la violation devant lâorgane judiciaire des Nations Unies. Le nombre et la diversitĂ© des conventions visĂ©es illustrent le caractĂšre vĂ©ritablement contingent de leur utilisation. Ces instruments ne sont mobilisĂ©s quâen tant quâils permettent dâĂ©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour, sans Ă©gard Ă leur contenu matĂ©riel.
B. LâuniformitĂ© des objectifs poursuivis
Les fondements invoquĂ©s par les Ătats sont donc extrĂȘmement variĂ©s, et le recours Ă la force peut-ĂȘtre prĂ©sentĂ© aussi bien sous le jour dâune atteinte Ă une vague dĂ©claration conventionnelle dâamitiĂ©43 que sous celui dâune violation du droit au travail44 des citoyens de lâĂtat requĂ©rant. La diversitĂ© des bases juridiques ne reflĂšte pourtant pas les objectifs qui animent rĂ©ellement les requĂȘtes. De ce point de vue, les attentes des demandeurs sont parfaitement univoques et les multiples violations allĂ©guĂ©es pour Ă©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour se fondent finalement dans des exigences communes.
Les demandes Ă titre conservatoire -. Plus encore que les demandes au fond, les mesures demandĂ©es Ă titre conservatoire permettent de se faire une idĂ©e prĂ©cise de la motivation des requĂ©rants confrontĂ©s Ă lâemploi de la force. Deux constats ressortent de lâĂ©tude de ces demandes. Le premier, quantitatif, tient au caractĂšre quasi-systĂ©matique de telles demandes45. Le second, qualitatif, confirme le caractĂšre univoque des mesures proposĂ©es. Il sâagit toujours (Ă lâexception de lâaffaire du jugement des prisonniers de guerre pakistanais) dâobtenir de la Cour une injonction de cessation du recours Ă la force.
Dans le diffĂ©rend qui lâopposait aux Ătats-Unis, le Nicaragua demanda ainsi Ă la Cour de dire, Ă titre conservatoire, que :
« the United States should immediately cease and desist from providing, directly or indirectly, any support [âŠ] and from any military and paramilitary activities [âŠ] and from any other use or threat of force in its relations with Nicaragua »46.
La mĂȘme demande se retrouve dans la requĂȘte formĂ©e Ă titre conservatoire par la RDC contre lâOuganda en 1999 : il sâagit dâobtenir le retrait de troupes, ainsi que la cessation immĂ©diate des combats et de lâassistance aux entitĂ©s en lutte contre le gouvernement congolais47. Dans la mesure oĂč elles sont fondĂ©es sur une acceptation gĂ©nĂ©rale de la compĂ©tence de la Cour par le dĂ©fendeur au titre de lâarticle 36 § 2 du statut, les conclusions de ces requĂȘtes tendant Ă lâapplication du droit de la Charte et du droit international gĂ©nĂ©ral ne soulĂšvent aucun problĂšme de principe. Il en va trĂšs diffĂ©remment quand la compĂ©tence de la Cour est Ă©tablie sur une clause compromissoire excluant ces normes du contentieux.
Les requĂ©rants ne se prĂ©occupent alors que trĂšs peu du dĂ©calage entre le contenu des conventions quâils invoquent pour fonder la compĂ©tence du juge et les mesures quâils en requiĂšrent. Dans sa requĂȘte de 1993, et bien que la compĂ©tence de la Cour ait pour principale base lâarticle IX de la convention gĂ©nocide48, la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine fonde cinq de ses six demandes Ă titre conservatoire sur le droit de la Charte, et plus prĂ©cisĂ©ment sur ses articles 2 et 5149. Une seule demande est en rapport avec la convention gĂ©nocide50. Câest Ă©galement une mesure de pur jus ad bellum que la RFY demande Ă titre conservatoire en 1999, dans lâaffaire qui lâoppose aux membres de lâOTAN51. Sans mĂȘme feindre dâinscrire sa requĂȘte dans le champ de la compĂ©tence de la Cour52, le demandeur se borne cette fois Ă demander que chaque dĂ©fendeur soit appelĂ© à « cesser immĂ©diatement de recourir Ă lâemploi de la force et [de] sâabstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de recours ou un recours Ă lâemploi de la force contre la RĂ©publique fĂ©dĂ©rale de Yougoslavie »53.
Les derniĂšres requĂȘtes relatives Ă lâemploi de la force dont a Ă©tĂ© saisie la Cour tĂ©moignent dâune Ă©volution. La dĂ©marche des Ătats pour obtenir de la Cour la cessation des hostilitĂ©s se veut plus subtile, et leurs demandes sont prĂ©sentĂ©es de maniĂšre plus indirecte. Ceci transparaĂźt dans la requĂȘte du Congo en 2002. Lâobjectif reste pour le demandeur dâobtenir de la Cour la « cessation de la guerre dâagression »54 dont il se prĂ©tend victime. Cependant, cette cessation nâest plus visĂ©e en tant que telle. Elle lâest uniquement en ce que la guerre est « source et cause de toutes les violations massives, graves et flagrantes de Droits de lâhomme et du Droit international humanitaire »55, et en ce quâen elle se fondent toutes les autres violations Ă©numĂ©rĂ©es dans la requĂȘte56. La guerre se prĂ©sente alors comme un agrĂ©gat de violations distinctes, qui, sâil ne peut faire lâobjet dâune requĂȘte en tant quâensemble, peut ĂȘtre dĂ©composĂ© en un faisceau dâillicites Ă lâĂ©gard desquels la compĂ©tence de la Cour est Ă©tablie.
La disjonction entre la guerre et ses effets alimente encore lâargumentation de la GĂ©orgie. La demande Ă titre conservatoire initiale57 sâen tient strictement Ă exiger de la Russie quâelle cesse ses violations de la convention sur lâĂ©limination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, qui sert de fondement Ă la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Aussi la demande de la GĂ©orgie suppose-t-elle uniquement de la part de la Russie lâabstention « from any and all conduct that could result, directly or indirectly, in any form of ethnic discrimination by its armed forces »58. Câest ainsi lâusage discriminatoire de la force par les armĂ©es russes envers les « ethnic Georgians » qui fait lâobjet de la requĂȘte, et non le principe du recours Ă la force lui-mĂȘme. Pourtant, la distinction ami â ennemi, inhĂ©rente Ă la situation de guerre, peut toujours ĂȘtre ramenĂ©e, in fine, Ă une discrimination ethnique ou nationale prohibĂ©e par la convention. DĂšs lors, câest bien la conduite des opĂ©rations de guerre qui est rendue impossible, et, Ă travers lâaccusation de discrimination, le recours Ă la force qui est visĂ©59. Le requĂ©rant gĂ©orgien procĂšde de la mĂȘme façon en ce qui concerne la demande de respect des rĂšgles du jus in bello. Aux termes de cette demande, la FĂ©dĂ©ration de Russie doit :
« immediately cease and desist from discriminatory violations of the human rights of ethnic Georgians, including attacks against civilians and civilian objects, murder, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian assistance, extensive pillage and destruction of towns and villages »60.
Le lexique et le contenu de la demande empruntent indubitablement au droit humanitaire. Toutefois, en identifiant les victimes comme des « ethnic Georgians », le demandeur rappelle Ă lâattention de la Cour que le diffĂ©rend est posĂ© en termes de discriminations.
Cette prĂ©tention consistant Ă obtenir une dĂ©cision de la Cour relativement Ă un objet a priori situĂ© hors du contentieux limitĂ© qui lui est soumis rappelle, Ă bien des Ă©gards, la pratique de la CEDH et revient, mutatis mutandis, Ă Ă©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour « par ricochet ». La pratique des Ătats en matiĂšre de saisine tend Ă disjoindre autant que possible les questions de compĂ©tence et celles de fond. La base de compĂ©tence retenue pour fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour sâavĂšre donc dans les requĂȘtes sans incidence rĂ©elle sur le contenu des mesures conservatoires demandĂ©es. Lâurgence Ă©prouvĂ©e par le demandeur de faire cesser la progression de son adversaire justifie tous les moyens propres Ă conduire la Cour Ă enjoindre, ne fĂ»t-ce quâĂ titre provisoire, la cessation des hostilitĂ©s.
Le contentieux au principal -. La question qui se pose dĂšs lors est de savoir si la phase conservatoire, et lâordonnance Ă©ventuelle par la Cour de la cessation des opĂ©rations militaires, Ă©puisent ou non le contentieux61. Il semble en pratique que les demandes au principal recoupent largement celles prĂ©sentĂ©es Ă titre conservatoire et tendent pour lâessentiel Ă obtenir la confirmation dĂ©finitive des mesures provisoires. Le trait distinctif essentiel entre les deux phases tient Ă ce quâĂ la demande de cessation de lâillicite sâajoute celle visant la rĂ©paration du prĂ©judice subi. Les questions de compĂ©tence ne disparaissent cependant pas, et le dĂ©bat peut mĂȘme sâaccentuer, la Cour ne se satisfaisant plus alors dâune simple compĂ©tence prima facie.
Les accusations relatives au recours Ă la force sont ainsi maintenues dans les requĂȘtes au principal. Ces demandes varient en fonction des spĂ©cificitĂ©s de chaque conflit : il sâagit par exemple dâingĂ©rence dans les affaires intĂ©rieures, dâatteintes Ă lâintĂ©gritĂ© des citoyens et Ă la libre circulation maritime dans les requĂȘtes du Nicaragua contre les Ătats-Unis, le Honduras et le Costa Rica62. Par delĂ les demandes tenant Ă la cessation des actes de gĂ©nocide63 et de recours Ă la force, la requĂȘte initiale de la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine64 vise aussi les violations des quatre conventions de GenĂšve de 1949, de leur protocole I de 1977, ainsi que des principes fondamentaux et coutumiers du droit de la guerre65, soit la majeure partie des rĂšgles de jus in bello. Elle vise encore divers instruments de protection des droits de lâhomme, telle la DĂ©claration universelle de 194866, ainsi que le droit international gĂ©nĂ©ral67 et la Charte des Nations unies68. La demande de la RFY au principal recouvre tant le recours Ă la force lui-mĂȘme (dont lâimmixtion dans les affaires intĂ©rieures)69 que ses modalitĂ©s (non discrimination envers la population civile, protection des biens culturels en temps de guerre, armes causant des maux superflus, dommages Ă lâenvironnement)70. La demande porte Ă©galement sur la violation des droits de lâhomme incluant notamment le droit Ă la vie, au travail, Ă lâinformation, aux soins de santĂ©71. Le seul point en relation avec la qualification de gĂ©nocide est placĂ© en dixiĂšme position dans la requĂȘte, aprĂšs mĂȘme la violation de lâinterdiction dâentraver la libre circulation sur les cours dâeaux. La requĂȘte de la RDC porte Ă©galement sur des violations du principe dâinterdiction du recours Ă la force, des conventions de GenĂšve ou encore des principaux instruments gĂ©nĂ©raux de droits de lâhomme72. Les griefs de torture et de violation de la sĂ©curitĂ© aĂ©rienne73, qui fondent la compĂ©tence de la Cour, nâinterviennent encore quâĂ un rang trĂšs infĂ©rieur.
Deux affaires, enfin, se distinguent en ce quâelles nâont pas pour objet principal la cessation de lâemploi de la force â celui-ci ayant cessĂ© au moment de la requĂȘte. NĂ©anmoins, si les requĂȘtes nâont pas pour objet la cessation de lâillicite que constitue lâemploi de la force, cette question demeure au centre des revendications. Dans lâaffaire des Plates-formes, lâIran souhaite de la sorte obtenir rĂ©paration du fait dâattaques militaires. Et si la Croatie prĂ©sente sa requĂȘte en apparence pure dâĂ©lĂ©ments extĂ©rieurs Ă la convention sur le gĂ©nocide, les demandes quâelle formule Ă titre de rĂ©paration exhalent comme un Ă©trange parfum de jus in bello. La restitution de biens culturels et les informations sur les disparus sont en effet deux mesures qui relĂšvent traditionnellement du droit de la guerre74.
Pour conclure de maniĂšre plus gĂ©nĂ©rale sur lâobjet des requĂȘtes soumises Ă la Cour en matiĂšre de faits de guerre, on observera que sâil « nâest pas demandĂ© Ă la Cour de mettre fin au conflit par le seul pouvoir des mots »75, le but poursuivi par les Ătats consiste bien Ă obtenir du juge une rĂ©solution dĂ©finitive du conflit. Si le conflit est en cours, la demande tend Ă en faire cesser les manifestations militaires. Sâil est achevĂ©, elle vise Ă obtenir rĂ©paration des dommages que les opĂ©rations passĂ©es ont occasionnĂ©s. Les demandeurs projettent alors sur les dĂ©cisions de la Cour internationale de justice les fonctions des instruments traditionnels du retour Ă la paix â tels cessez-le-feu et accords de paix â quâils nâont pas Ă©tĂ© en mesure, pour des raisons diverses76, de faire adopter par leur adversaire. Cette pratique ne manque pas non plus de rĂ©vĂ©ler, sous forme de nĂ©gatif, les positions adoptĂ©es â ou tues â par le Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ© au dĂ©triment des demandeurs77.
II. La réception de ces qualifications par la Cour
La disjonction opĂ©rĂ©e entre la base de compĂ©tence invoquĂ©e et les objectifs poursuivis par les Ătats constitue le trait marquant de leur pratique de saisine. La question est alors de savoir comment la Cour accueille les requĂȘtes dont les demandes au fond nâentretiennent quâun lien discutable avec la norme juridique qui fonde sa compĂ©tence. Les jugements rendus en la matiĂšre sâavĂšrent finalement peu nombreux78. Cette jurisprudence permet pourtant dĂ©jĂ dâisoler les traits essentiels de lâapprĂ©ciation par la Cour des qualifications de faits de guerre Ă©tablies par les Ătats.
La pratique consistant Ă dĂ©connecter le fond du dĂ©bat et les fondements de la compĂ©tence du juge a ainsi trĂšs tĂŽt Ă©tĂ© dĂ©noncĂ©e par les dĂ©fendeurs. DĂšs lâaffaire Nicaragua, les Ătats-Unis ont mis en lumiĂšre le nĂ©cessitĂ© dâun lien entre les faits ayant motivĂ© la requĂȘte et la base de compĂ©tence invoquĂ©e pour Ă©tablir la compĂ©tence de la Cour. La base contestĂ©e Ă©tait le traitĂ© dâamitiĂ©, de navigation et de commerce conclu entre les parties en 1956. Les Ătats-Unis firent valoir quâil devait exister un « rapport raisonnable »79 entre la base de compĂ©tence allĂ©guĂ©e et les demandes soumises Ă la Cour. En dâautres termes, les faits litigieux devaient ĂȘtre susceptibles dâune qualification entrant dans le champ du traitĂ©. Ce rapport, selon lâexception soulevĂ©e, faisait dĂ©faut en lâespĂšce. Cette notion de « rapport raisonnable » sera reprise ultĂ©rieurement par les Ătats-Unis dans lâaffaire des Plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres, ainsi que par le Rwanda dĂšs le premier diffĂ©rend lâayant opposĂ© au Congo80.
Lâargument se conçoit aisĂ©ment. En effet, ne pas exiger de lien entre lâobjet auquel sâapplique la clause compromissoire et la nature du diffĂ©rend aurait contredit Ă la fois la lettre et lâesprit des traitĂ©s contenant de telles clauses. Câest dâailleurs en se fondant sur les termes mĂȘmes de la clause contenue dans le traitĂ© de 1956 que la Cour reprend lâargument Ă son compte, substituant Ă lâidĂ©e de « rapport raisonnable » celle de lâexistence dâ« un diffĂ©rend entre les parties, notamment quant Ă âlâinterprĂ©tation ou lâapplicationâ du traitĂ© »81. La formulation dâespĂšce sera lĂ©gĂšrement modifiĂ©e pour devenir dĂšs 1993 une position de principe, la Cour affirmant dorĂ©navant la nĂ©cessitĂ© dâĂ©tablir entre les parties « lâexistence dâun diffĂ©rend entrant dans les dispositions de la convention »82.
Cependant, le principe de lâexigence dâun lien nâimplique pas la simplicitĂ© de sa mise en Ćuvre. Le lien proposĂ© par les Ătats peut simplement ne pas exister (a). Quand bien mĂȘme sa rĂ©alitĂ© serait attestĂ©e, il peut encore ne dĂ©voiler quâune image trĂšs partielle, et donc faussĂ©e, de la rĂ©alitĂ© soumise au jugement de la Cour (b).
A. Lâexigence dâun lien entre la qualification invoquĂ©e et le fait saisi
La question de lâexistence dâun « rapport » entre les faits soumis au jugement de la Cour et son champ de compĂ©tence a Ă©tĂ© soulevĂ©e Ă de nombreuses reprises, au point que certains Ătats ont pu dĂ©plorer « des controverses stĂ©riles entre les parties sur la question de savoir si [d]es comportements sont ou non âsuffisamment directement liĂ©sâ Ă la Convention »83. Pourtant, la contestation de ce lien nâa souvent rien de dilatoire. Sa dĂ©faillance peut simplement ĂȘtre constatĂ©e par la Cour sur la base des Ă©lĂ©ments qui lui sont prĂ©sentĂ©s, mais elle peut encore nĂ©cessiter de la part des juges un travail de dĂ©construction de la fiction Ă©laborĂ©e par les demandeurs.
Lâexistence du lien -. La nĂ©cessitĂ© dâun lien conduit la Cour Ă dĂ©cliner sa compĂ©tence lorsque des instruments sans rapport avec le diffĂ©rend soumis sont en jeu. Cette nĂ©cessitĂ© la conduit par exemple, dans lâaffaire introduite par la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine en 1993, Ă Ă©carter le traitĂ© relatif Ă la protection des minoritĂ©s conclu suite Ă la premiĂšre guerre mondiale, faute dâune demande bosniaque entrant dans le champ territorial du traitĂ©84. Le mĂȘme dĂ©faut de demande liĂ©e au texte invoquĂ© conduit la Cour Ă rejeter sa compĂ©tence au titre de la convention de MontrĂ©al sur la sĂ©curitĂ© aĂ©rienne dans lâaffaire portĂ©e par la RDC contre le Rwanda. La convention sur la discrimination Ă lâĂ©gard des femmes est de mĂȘme Ă©cartĂ©e, dans la mĂȘme affaire, le demandeur nâayant pas « prĂ©cisĂ© quels seraient les droits protĂ©gĂ©s par cette convention qui auraient Ă©tĂ© mĂ©connus par le Rwanda »85. Dans ces diffĂ©rents exemples, câest un dĂ©faut en quelque sorte manifeste de diffĂ©rend qui conduit la Cour Ă ne pas se reconnaĂźtre compĂ©tente.
Mais lâabsence de lien peut Ă©galement ĂȘtre moins Ă©vidente, notamment lorsque les Ătats cherchent Ă inclure leur diffĂ©rend dans les formulations trĂšs gĂ©nĂ©rales qui caractĂ©risent souvent les premiĂšres lignes des traitĂ©s internationaux. Câest alors le dĂ©faut de valeur normative du texte prĂ©tendument violĂ© qui exclut le diffĂ©rend du champ de la convention et Ă©carte la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Les formules traditionnelles de la diplomatie â la paix Ă©ternelle et lâamitiĂ© sincĂšre â rĂ©vĂšlent alors Ă la fois leur vacuitĂ© et leur incapacitĂ© Ă fonder une action. La Cour, de ce point de vue, semble avoir durci sa position entre lâarrĂȘt Nicaragua et celui des Plates-formes. En effet, dans le premier arrĂȘt, les manquements amĂ©ricains aux rĂ©fĂ©rences, trĂšs gĂ©nĂ©rales, Ă la paix et Ă lâamitiĂ©86 incluses dans le prĂ©ambule paraissent, bien quâelles soient visĂ©es en bloc avec dâautres rĂšgles, susceptibles de fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Cette position conduira lâIran, dans une premiĂšre version de ses Ă©critures, Ă invoquer la violation du traitĂ© dâamitiĂ© le liant aux Ătats-Unis en son « esprit et son objet »87, moyen qui sera ensuite retirĂ© par le demandeur88. En effet, la Cour est dĂ©sormais beaucoup moins disposĂ©e Ă prendre en considĂ©ration les engagements gĂ©nĂ©raux de cette nature. Alors quâen 1984, elle avait retenu le seul fait, Ă©noncĂ© dans le prĂ©ambule, que les Ătats Ă©taient « dĂ©sireux de resserrer les liens de paix et dâamitiĂ© qui unissent traditionnellement les deux pays », elle nie toute portĂ©e normative Ă lâarticle 1er du traitĂ© avec lâIran, lequel dispose pourtant quâ« il y aura paix stable, durable et sincĂšre » entre les parties. Au vrai, câest moins la valeur normative de cet article qui est niĂ©e que son autonomie89. Toutefois, quand bien mĂȘme la Cour ne saurait le « perdre de vue »90, lâarticle en question fixe uniquement un objectif Ă atteindre, un objectif au travers duquel les autres dispositions doivent ĂȘtre interprĂ©tĂ©es91. Il ne saurait donc en naĂźtre de diffĂ©rend entre les parties, ni, par lĂ mĂȘme, de compĂ©tence pour la Cour92.
Le caractĂšre fictif du lien -. LâhypothĂšse du caractĂšre fictif recouvre dans une large mesure celle de lâinexistence. Mais alors que lâinexistence se caractĂ©risait par lâabsence de faits entrant dans le champ des instruments invoquĂ©s, le caractĂšre fictif rĂ©sulte de lâinadĂ©quation des faits litigieux Ă la qualification que le demandeur leur applique. Quoique ce caractĂšre se rĂ©duise en dĂ©finitive Ă une absence de diffĂ©rend, il mĂ©rite une attention particuliĂšre. Les manĆuvres dont il procĂšde sont en effet rĂ©vĂ©latrices des difficultĂ©s sâopposant Ă la dĂ©marche judiciaire des demandeurs, et des moyens employĂ©s pour les contourner.
Tel est le cas dans lâaffaire licĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force. Dans cette derniĂšre, la RFY porte devant la Cour un grief tenant aux frappes aĂ©riennes quâelle subit de la part des membres de lâOTAN, mais fonde, pour lâessentiel, la compĂ©tence de la juridiction sur la convention gĂ©nocide93. Les dĂ©fendeurs contesteront la pertinence du recours Ă cette convention94. Ils seront sur ce point suivis par les juges, qui constateront â ce dont personne ne pouvait sĂ©rieusement douter â « que le recours Ă la force en soi ne saurait constituer un acte de gĂ©nocide »95. De fait, lâĂ©lĂ©ment intentionnel caractĂ©ristique du crime de gĂ©nocide faisait dĂ©faut96. Les faits dont elle Ă©tait saisie nâĂ©tant pas susceptibles dâĂȘtre qualifiĂ©s de gĂ©nocide, la Cour refusa, dĂšs son apprĂ©ciation prima facie, de reconnaĂźtre sa compĂ©tence sur la base de la convention de 194897. Mais câest seulement aprĂšs une dĂ©construction de lâargumentation du demandeur que la Cour peut en dĂ©cider ainsi. La RFY avait en effet Ă©tayĂ© son argumentation tendant Ă transposer les faits de guerre en crimes de gĂ©nocide : selon le demandeur, la guerre soumet, en contradiction avec lâarticle II c) de la convention sur le gĂ©nocide, « un groupe national Ă des conditions devant entraĂźner sa destruction physique » 98. De maniĂšre plus prĂ©cise, sont visĂ©es comme sources de conditions entraĂźnant la destruction physique du groupe les dommages Ă lâenvironnement, ainsi que lâusage dâarmes provoquant des dĂ©gĂąts Ă long terme, tel lâuranium appauvri99. Les destructions dâinfrastructures, notamment Ă©lectriques, tĂ©moigneraient « âimplicitement de lâintention de dĂ©truire totalement ou partiellementâ le groupe national yougoslave en tant que tel »100. Le caractĂšre outrĂ© de la qualification laisse toutefois soupçonner que plus quâune argumentation, câest un prĂ©texte que la RFY offrait Ă la Cour : implicitement, il Ă©tait demandĂ© Ă la haute juridiction de « faire comme si » les faits Ă©taient ce quâen disait le demandeur, au titre du caractĂšre fondamental des intĂ©rĂȘts Ă protĂ©ger. La Cour refusa dâentĂ©riner la fiction.
Le caractĂšre fictif du lien est encore en partie la cause du rejet par la Cour de la requĂȘte de la RDC Ă lâencontre du Rwanda. Ă la plĂ©thore dâinstruments invoquĂ©s par le demandeur, il faut avant tout noter que le dĂ©fendeur a trĂšs peu opposĂ© lâargument du caractĂšre fictif. Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, la dĂ©fense limita son discours Ă de trĂšs classiques â mais aussi trĂšs probantes â questions dâopposabilitĂ© des instruments101. Lâargument du caractĂšre fictif reprend sa place lorsque lâopposabilitĂ© de la convention visĂ©e ne peut ĂȘtre remise en question de maniĂšre incontestable. Ainsi, indubitablement liĂ© par la convention de Vienne, le Rwanda plaide le dĂ©faut de lien entre le diffĂ©rend soumis Ă la Cour et lâobjet de lâarticle 66 de cette convention102. Redonnant Ă lâarticle visĂ© son vĂ©ritable sens et Ă la notion sa vĂ©ritable portĂ©e, les juges avaient, dĂšs le stade conservatoire, constatĂ© lâabsence de tout diffĂ©rend « au sujet dâun conflit entre un traitĂ© et une norme impĂ©rative du droit international »103. Suite Ă lâĂ©lucidation dâune manoeuvre identique, la Cour avait Ă©galement Ă©cartĂ© la convention Unesco : la clause compromissoire contenue dans cet instrument ne concernait en effet que lâinterprĂ©tation de la convention, tandis que la demande congolaise visait essentiellement Ă faire sanctionner un dĂ©faut dâapplication. Une telle requĂȘte, comme le conclura la Cour, « nâapparaĂźt donc pas entrer dans les prĂ©visions dudit article »104.
Câest dâun tout autre genre de fiction que procĂšde la qualification suivante. Si la stratĂ©gie du demandeur tend parfois Ă lâamplification des faits, Ă leur exagĂ©ration pour leur faire endosser une qualification quâils nâatteignent pas, les dĂ©marches communes au Nicaragua et Ă lâIran procĂšdent dâun raisonnement inverse. PlutĂŽt que dâexagĂ©rer les faits, il sâagit cette fois de les ramener Ă des proportions sans rapport avec leur gravitĂ© initiale. Dans leurs argumentations portant sur la violation des traitĂ©s dâamitiĂ©, les demandeurs font grief aux Ătats-Unis dâavoir, par leurs actions militaires, manquĂ© Ă leur obligation de traiter de maniĂšre juste et Ă©quitable les ressortissants, biens et entreprises de la partie adverse. Le Nicaragua souligne ainsi dans son mĂ©moire que des :
« armed attacks against Nicaragua by air, land and sea, resulting in the loss of human lives, severe human suffering and material damages cannot be seen as âequitable treatment to the persons, enterprises and other interestsâ of Nicaraguyan nationals »105.
Lâargument est tellement incontestable quâil en devient suspect, et si lâhabit du gĂ©nocide est trop grand pour le recours Ă la force, celui de lâentorse faite Ă une obligation gĂ©nĂ©rale inscrite dans un traitĂ© Ă finalitĂ© commerciale est bien trop Ă©troit. Contournant lâĂ©vidence apparente de la proposition, la Cour restitue Ă la norme invoquĂ©e sa portĂ©e et aux faits leurs proportions et leur nature. Elle resitue le discours dans un champ plus large que celui, artificiellement rĂ©duit, dans lequel entendait le tenir le demandeur. Cette forme de fiction se fond cette fois avec le caractĂšre partiel des requĂȘtes dont est saisie la Cour.
B. Lâadmission des qualifications fragmentaires
Pour les Ătats soumis Ă lâemploi de la force, obtenir une dĂ©cision de la Cour est une nĂ©cessitĂ©. Face Ă cet impĂ©ratif, il importe peu pour les Ătats que sous la qualification Ă©tablie ne se subsume quâune partie des faits. LâentrĂ©e par une porte dĂ©robĂ©e, aux dimensions rĂ©duites, implique pourtant de laisser hors du prĂ©toire une part importante, tant quantitativement que qualitativement, des griefs. Câest alors le dĂ©bat entier qui est modifiĂ© par la dĂ©marche initiale.
Le caractĂšre partiel du lien -. Le cadre procĂ©dural ne laisse ni Ă la Cour ni au requĂ©rant une grande marge de manĆuvre. Le dilemme de la compĂ©tence se pose alors en termes de peu ou pas. Certains jugements, fondĂ©s sur des moyens particuliĂšrement anecdotiques au regard de la rĂ©alitĂ© des faits, posent cependant de sĂ©rieux problĂšmes de politique judiciaire. Ils posent tout autant la question de savoir si une politique du tout ou rien ne serait pas, pour tous les protagonistes, plus satisfaisante. Saisie dâune portion parfois infime dâun ensemble sur lequel elle ne peut porter les yeux, la Cour prend le risque de rendre des dĂ©cisions difficilement comprĂ©hensibles. Si le risque dâinapplication de ses dĂ©cisions ne doit pas influer sur son action106, sans doute doit-elle avoir Ă©gard Ă leur applicabilitĂ©.
Le caractĂšre partiel du diffĂ©rend soumis Ă la Cour peut prendre deux formes, illustrĂ©es par la dĂ©fense prĂ©sentĂ©e par le Honduras. Invoquant le caractĂšre gĂ©nĂ©ral du conflit en AmĂ©rique centrale, lâĂtat souligna lâaspect artificiel de la division, Ă la fois matĂ©rielle et personnelle, que tentait dâopĂ©rer le Nicaragua107. Plus encore que la division personnelle â qui peut dĂ©jĂ emporter dâinextricables difficultĂ©s opĂ©rationnelles pour la mise en Ćuvre de la dĂ©cision â, câest la division matĂ©rielle qui sâavĂšre problĂ©matique. Ainsi, dans lâaffaire qui opposait les Ătats-Unis au Nicaragua, la gravitĂ© de faits animant la requĂȘte se rĂ©duisit dans des violations bĂ©nignes du traitĂ© dâamitiĂ©, telles lâinterdiction dâentraver la circulation maritime, celle dâimposer des entraves Ă lâimportation de biens depuis lâautre partie, celle dâinterdire le transit sur son territoire Ă lâautre partie ou encore dâaccorder un traitement Ă©quitable aux personnes, biens et intĂ©rĂȘts nicaraguayens108. Dans lâaffaire des Plates-formes, câest sur une simple atteinte au commerce, telle quâenvisagĂ©e par lâarticle X § 1 du traitĂ©, que se concentrera lâensemble du dĂ©bat judiciaire.
La position de la Cour sur cette segmentation des diffĂ©rends est explicitĂ©e dans lâaffaire des Otages109, reprise notamment dans lâaffaire Nicaragua : « aucune disposition du Statut ou du RĂšglement nâinterdit Ă [la Cour] de se saisir dâun aspect dâun diffĂ©rend pour la seule raison que ce diffĂ©rend comporterait dâautres aspects, si importants soient-ils »110. Dâun point de vue technique, lâargument ne suscite pas nĂ©cessairement la critique. En effet, le fait quâun faisceau de diffĂ©rends juridiques existe entre les parties ne doit pas empĂȘcher de les rĂ©gler indĂ©pendamment les uns des autres, dĂšs lors quâils sont suffisamment distincts. De mĂȘme, câest formellement le strict droit dâune partie de saisir la Cour dâun diffĂ©rend, ne fĂ»t-il quâun parmi dâautres. Une telle division devient cependant problĂ©matique lorsquâelle conduit Ă dĂ©sagrĂ©ger un tout indissociable en une somme de parties artificiellement abstraites de leur contexte. Une synecdoque injustifiĂ©e altĂšre alors le raisonnement111.
Le caractĂšre factice du litige -. Admettant dâĂȘtre saisie dâun accessoire sans commune mesure avec le principal, la Cour ouvre la voie Ă des requĂȘtes factices, fondĂ©es sur des diffĂ©rends mineurs. Le litige en dĂ©bat devant la juridiction est alors :
« parfaitement secondaire dans un contentieux dont lâenjeu est bien plus fondamental. On conçoit Ă ce titre que lâappui trouvĂ© dans un traitĂ© de commerce et de navigation pour faire trancher des questions intĂ©ressant la paix et la sĂ©curitĂ© internationale suscite quelque malaise »112.
Depuis lâaffaire Nicaragua, qui suscita ces propos, le malaise est persistant.
Lâargument de facticitĂ© est dĂ©ployĂ© par de nombreux dĂ©fendeurs dans leurs argumentations. Les Ătats-Unis lâinvoqueront par exemple Ă lâencontre du Nicaragua â auquel il sera reprochĂ© de dissimuler derriĂšre des requĂȘtes diverses une unique revendication tenant Ă lâemploi de la force113 â et de lâIran â dont la requĂȘte est rĂ©sumĂ©e par le dĂ©fendeur Ă la volontĂ© de le sanctionner pour son soutien Ă lâIraq114. Le mĂȘme argument dâ« artificialitĂ© » servira le discours du Honduras contre le Nicaragua, lâobjet de la saisine consistant Ă exercer des « pressions politiques » sur les Ătats voisins115. La Cour cependant considĂšrera quâil ne lui appartient pas de « sâinterroger sur les motivations dâordre politique qui peuvent animer un Ătat, Ă un moment donnĂ© ou dans des circonstances dĂ©terminĂ©es, Ă choisir le rĂšglement judiciaire »116. Les griefs officiellement formulĂ©s devant la Cour, dĂšs lors quâils sont rĂ©els, attestent lâexistence dâun diffĂ©rend entrant dans le champ de la convention invoquĂ©e pour fonder la compĂ©tence de la Cour. Peu importe alors quâils nâintĂ©ressent que trĂšs secondairement le demandeur, et que le recours Ă la justice internationale soit essentiellement instrumental.
Ainsi, seule lâinexistence ou le caractĂšre fictif du lien dont le demandeur prĂ©tend dĂ©duire la compĂ©tence de la Cour constitue un obstacle Ă cette compĂ©tence. Le caractĂšre partiel des requĂȘtes, qui conduit Ă leur facticitĂ©, ne la conduit pas Ă dĂ©cliner sa compĂ©tence. Sâen tenant Ă lâapparence, la Cour adopte pourtant une dĂ©marche excessivement formaliste, qui dĂšs lors ne convainc pas. En effet, la fiction se caractĂ©rise par la volontĂ© de faire croire Ă ce qui nâest pas, et la facticitĂ© procĂšde dâune utilisation contrefaite de ce qui est. Or, il nâest pas certain, en lâĂ©tat de la jurisprudence de la Cour, que la diffĂ©rence y soit trĂšs marquĂ©e.
III. Le juge international et la guerre
Le consensualisme exigĂ© pour lâaccĂšs au juge international, combinĂ© Ă lâabsence de clauses compromissoires figurant dans les conventions portant sur le droit de la guerre, engendre un dĂ©placement singulier du dĂ©bat judiciaire117. Les effets de ce dĂ©placement dans les arrĂȘts rendus au fond par la Cour pourraient faire lâobjet dâune analyse approfondie. Il convient toutefois, pour rester dans le cadre de cette Ă©tude, de sâen tenir Ă quelques constats provisoires. On peut ainsi signaler la tendance de la Cour Ă extraire, parfois sous la contrainte dâimpĂ©ratifs procĂ©duraux, les phĂ©nomĂšnes de violence de leur rĂ©alitĂ© matĂ©rielle. Les dĂ©fauts de cette tendance conduisent Ă se demander si le vieil argument tendant Ă considĂ©rer lâinstitution comme inadaptĂ©e Ă la rĂ©solution de situations dâhostilitĂ©s actives est entiĂšrement infondĂ©. Peut-on en effet, ainsi que le prĂ©tend la haute juridiction, se dĂ©sintĂ©resser du conflit armĂ© en tant que tel pour nây voir quâune simple « situation » appelant un rĂšglement pacifique des questions juridiques en cause118 ? Nây a-t-il pas quelque illusion Ă prĂ©tendre apprĂ©hender un diffĂ©rend dâordre guerrier comme un ensemble stable de droits et dâobligations Ă rĂ©partir, et quelque illogisme Ă prĂ©tendre rĂ©gler pacifiquement un diffĂ©rend pour lequel une guerre est en train de se dĂ©rouler ? Une telle approche emporte deux consĂ©quences : dâune part, le discours quâelle produit sur les conflits armĂ©s ne peut-ĂȘtre que tronquĂ© ; dâautre part, la volontĂ© rĂ©itĂ©rĂ©e de traiter la guerre comme un diffĂ©rend nâĂ©chappant pas au droit commun soulĂšve de graves problĂšmes de technique juridique.
Un discours judiciaire tronquĂ© -. La Cour, acceptant une compĂ©tence fondĂ©e sur des instruments qui ne recouvrent quâune portion du conflit entre les parties, sâen tiendra strictement aux limites imposĂ©es par ces instruments. Il est donc impossible, comme elle le rappellera Ă la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine119, dâĂ©largir le dĂ©bat une fois Ă©tablie la compĂ©tence. Les normes du droit de la guerre, propres Ă rĂ©gir la situation, nâoffrent aucun soutien aux revendications du demandeur. Les dĂ©fauts de la phase de la compĂ©tence se transfĂšrent aux dĂ©bats sur le fond. La dĂ©cision de la Cour portera, et ne portera que, sur les violations des conventions comportant une clause compromissoire applicable. Alors que la situation matĂ©rielle est indiscutablement de nature guerriĂšre, aucune rĂšgle du droit de la guerre ne sous-tendra la solution apportĂ©e. Dans ces conditions, la saisine de la Cour est au mieux sans effet sur la rĂ©alitĂ© de la situation et le discours produit est inĂ©vitablement tronquĂ© des illicites et rĂ©parations essentiels. Lâintention est sans doute louable, mais ce « dĂ©peçage » du conflit armĂ© en plusieurs unitĂ©s conflictuelles susceptibles dâĂȘtre rĂ©solues indĂ©pendamment les unes des autres mĂ©connaĂźt lâunitĂ© organique de ce type de situation. En Ă©ludant le contexte, la Cour sâĂ©pargne les considĂ©rations tragiques qui caractĂ©risent encore les relations interĂ©tatiques. Ses arrĂȘts peuvent alors Ă bon compte donner lâimage dâune sociĂ©tĂ© internationale marchant Ă pas rapide vers une civilisation des mĆurs. Cette reprĂ©sentation optimiste contraste toutefois radicalement avec celle que renvoie la jurisprudence des tribunaux pĂ©naux internationaux. Ces juridictions, qui ne manquent pas de ressasser les phĂ©nomĂšnes de violence massive, invitent en effet Ă des conclusions tout autres. La juxtaposition des deux pratiques juridictionnelles conduit en fait, subrepticement, Ă dresser Ă partir du droit international le tableau dâun ordre pacifiĂ©, qui ne serait quâaccidentellement troublĂ© par des violences de nature individuelle.
Il est certain, en tout Ă©tat de cause, quâil y a un paradoxe Ă tenir la Cour internationale de justice Ă distance de la mise en Ćuvre du droit de la guerre, et Ă mener en parallĂšle une juridictionnalisation toujours croissante de cette question Ă lâĂ©chelle individuelle. Cette contradiction procĂšde dâun obscurcissement du discours juridique qui, en reportant sur les seuls individus la responsabilitĂ© des crimes de masse, tend Ă occulter leur caractĂšre Ă©minemment collectif.
Les normes invoquĂ©es et la situation de guerre -. La seconde consĂ©quence de cette pratique tient en lâapplication de normes Ă des situations quâelles ne sont certainement pas appelĂ©es Ă rĂ©gir. Dans son ordonnance relative Ă la situation en GĂ©orgie, la Cour concĂšde que les manquements invoquĂ©s Ă la convention sur lâĂ©limination de la discrimination raciale « pourraient ĂȘtre couverts par dâautres rĂšgles du droit international, notamment de droit humanitaire »120. La question soulevĂ©e est, une nouvelle fois, celle de la place des droits de lâhomme en cas de conflit armĂ©. On touche ici une limite de la thĂ©orie du droit humanitaire comme lex specialis, thĂ©orie en laquelle la Cour a cherchĂ© depuis 1996 Ă enserrer le droit de la guerre121. Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, les normes du droit de la paix continuent Ă trouver application en temps de guerre, et câest seulement en tant que loi spĂ©ciale que le droit humanitaire sâapplique122. Outre le problĂšme dâopportunitĂ© que soulĂšve immĂ©diatement la question, sa mise en Ćuvre pose de sĂ©rieuses difficultĂ©s lorsque survient justement un conflit entre une norme gĂ©nĂ©rale, applicable en tous temps, et une autre spĂ©ciale au temps de guerre. Lâaffaire gĂ©orgienne est Ă cet Ă©gard symptomatique : la discrimination prohibĂ©e par la convention de 1965 trouve dans une large mesure son pendant dans le droit humanitaire. Lâarticle 3 commun, les articles 13 et 27 de la IVĂšme convention de GenĂšve prohibent en effet les discriminations dĂ©favorables fondĂ©es sur « la race, la couleur, la religion ou la croyance, le sexe, la naissance ou la fortune, ou tout autre critĂšre analogue »123. Dans le systĂšme Ă©tabli par la Cour, la loi gĂ©nĂ©rale que constitue la convention de 1965 devrait logiquement sâeffacer devant les rĂšgles applicables du droit humanitaire, et la Russie ne serait donc responsable que de la violation de ces derniĂšres. La difficultĂ© tient Ă ce que la convention de 1965 prĂ©voit pour son application la compĂ©tence de la Cour, tandis que la rĂšgle de droit humanitaire ne le fait pas. Quel devient alors le fondement de la compĂ©tence de la Cour en lâespĂšce ? Sauf Ă admettre, au pĂ©ril de la logique et du droit, la transposition de lâobligation procĂ©durale affĂ©rente Ă une norme Ă lâensemble des autres normes de contenu similaire, il est impossible de trouver une quelconque acceptation par la Russie de la juridiction de la Cour pour lâapplication des mesures de jus in bello. LâĂ©chappatoire, alors, peut consister Ă demeurer dans le champ du droit de la paix, en niant lâapplicabilitĂ© Ă la situation du droit humanitaire, et donc lâexistence dâun conflit armĂ©124. Ici rĂ©side toute la difficultĂ© du systĂšme que tente dâĂ©laborer la Cour : Ă©quation Ă multiples variables, la solution en pratique devient imprĂ©visible. La pondĂ©ration humaniste que peut encore ĂȘtre tentĂ©e dây appliquer la juridiction ne compensera assurĂ©ment pas lâincertitude. Au stade des exceptions prĂ©liminaires, la Cour pouvait admettre sa compĂ©tence prima facie en Ă©vitant dâaborder frontalement la question. Il sera certainement plus difficile de lâomettre lors du jugement au fond.
Notes
1 Ces saisines portent sur sept contextes de recours aux armes distincts, dans le cadre de conflits internationaux comme internes, voire mixtes. Elles ont pu concerner â alternativement ou cumulativement â le jus ad bellum et le jus in bello. Certaines situations ont donnĂ© lieu Ă plusieurs requĂȘtes. Les frappes de lâOTAN contre la RĂ©publique fĂ©dĂ©rale de Yougoslavie (RFY) en 1999 ont ainsi Ă©tĂ© la cause de dix affaires, chacune Ă©tant portĂ©e contre un membre diffĂ©rent de lâOrganisation. De mĂȘme, la situation en RĂ©publique dĂ©mocratique du Congo a Ă©tĂ© source de quatre requĂȘtes (contre le Burundi, lâOuganda et le Rwanda, cette derniĂšre ayant Ă©tĂ© renouvelĂ©e en 2002). Le conflit en AmĂ©rique centrale en a gĂ©nĂ©rĂ© trois (contre les Ătats-Unis, le Costa Rica et le Honduras), tandis que celui liĂ© Ă la dissolution de lâex-Yougoslavie dans la premiĂšre moitiĂ© des annĂ©es 90 en a entraĂźnĂ© deux â de la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine puis de la Croatie â contre la RFY. Le conflit gĂ©orgien de lâĂ©tĂ© 2008, lâaffaire des plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres iraniennes et le diffĂ©rend indo-pakistanais constituent les autres occurrences de ce type de contentieux. A Ă©tĂ© exclue du dĂ©compte, comme du reste de lâanalyse, lâaffaire du dĂ©troit de Corfou : cette espĂšce se distingue trop des autres contentieux pour ĂȘtre mise utilement sur un mĂȘme plan. Pour une Ă©tude systĂ©matique des affaires impliquant lâemploi de la force, voy. Georges Labrecque, La force et le droit, jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice, QuĂ©bec, Ă©ditions Yvon Blais, Bruylant, 646 p.
2 A. DecenciÚre-FerrandiÚre, « Quelques réflexions touchant le rÚglement des conflits internationaux », RGDIP, 1929, pp. 416-451.
3 C.I.J., ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Ătats-Unis d’AmĂ©rique), compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, arrĂȘt, Recueil1984, p. 435, § 96.
4 J. Verhoeven, « Le droit, le juge et la violence. Les arrĂȘts Nicaragua c. Ătats-Unis », RGDIP, 1987, pp. 1159-1239 ;
A. Pellet, « Le glaive et la balance », in Y. Dinstein (dir.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity â Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 539-566.
5 Sur la notion de « saisine » en droit international et son régime, voy. M. Forteau, « La saisine des juridictions internationales à vocation universelle », in H. RuizFabri et J.M. Sorel, La saisine des juridictions internationales, Paris, Pedone, 2005, pp. 9-87.
6 C.I.J., LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, Recueil 1999, pp. 131-132, §§ 16-19.
7 Idem, p. 132, § 20.
8 Le fondement de lâagrĂ©ment ad hoc visĂ© Ă lâarticle 38 § 5 du rĂšglement de la Cour a Ă©tĂ© incorporĂ© dans de nombreuses requĂȘtes concernant des faits de guerre. Lâaccord corrĂ©latif du dĂ©fendeur nâa cependant jamais Ă©tĂ© obtenu.
9 La Cour confirmera lâabsence dans le jus in bello de clause propre Ă fonder sa compĂ©tence dans lâaffaire relative Ă lâapplication de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide, exceptions prĂ©liminaires, arrĂȘt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 595, § 39, p 620. En ce qui concerne le jus ad bellum, il est significatif de constater que la Charte des Nations Unies elle-mĂȘme est dĂ©pourvue de toute clause de ce type.
10 Convention internationale sur l’Ă©limination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, adoptĂ©e par lâAssemblĂ©e gĂ©nĂ©rale de lâONU le 21 dĂ©cembre 1965 (rĂ©solution 2106 (XX)) et ouverte Ă la signature le 7 mars 1966.
11 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 12 aoĂ»t 2008, dĂ©posĂ©e par la RĂ©publique de GĂ©orgie contre la FĂ©dĂ©ration de Russie, p. 29, § 82 (Lorsque les documents ou plaidoiries citĂ©s nâont pas encore fait lâobjet dâune publication dans la sĂ©rie MĂ©moires, plaidoiries et documents, les renvois sont opĂ©rĂ©s vers les versions numĂ©riques mises Ă disposition sur le site de la Cour [http://www.icj-cij.org]).
12 C.I.J., Application de la convention internationale sur lâĂ©limination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (GĂ©orgie c. Russie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, § 112 (non publiĂ©).
13 Opinion dissidente Ă lâordonnance du 15 octobre 2008, § 3. Un autre argument de lâopinion dissidente tient au manque dâĂ©gard aux conditions procĂ©durales de la clause compromissoire invoquĂ©e : la jurisprudence de la Cour sur lâobligation et la possibilitĂ© pour les parties de nĂ©gocier en situation de conflit a fait lâobjet dâapprĂ©ciations diffĂ©rentes : la Cour a ainsi considĂ©rĂ© dans lâaffaire Nicaragua que les circonstances de lâespĂšce rendaient illusoire le prĂ©alable diplomatique exigĂ© par le traitĂ© de 1956 (ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitaires, exceptions prĂ©liminaires, op. cit., § 83). Elle exigera cependant de la RDC la preuve dâun tel prĂ©alable (C.I.J., ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requĂȘte: 2002) (RĂ©publique dĂ©mocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, Recueil 2002, p. 247, § 79).
14 LâintitulĂ© mĂȘme de lâaffaire (Instance introduite par la GĂ©orgie) semble rĂ©vĂ©ler la difficultĂ© Ă dĂ©terminer lâobjet rĂ©el de la requĂȘte. Sur lâintitulĂ© des affaires devant la Cour, voy. M. Kamto, « LâintitulĂ© dâune affaire portĂ©e devant la C.I.J. », RBDI, 2001-1, pp. 5-22.
15 RequĂȘte dĂ©posĂ©e par la GĂ©orgie, op. cit., p. 30, point a).
16 Idem, p. 30, point f).
17 Ibid., p. 30, point h).
18 Plaidoirie dâAlain Pellet, Compte-rendu de lâaudience du 8 septembre 2008 Ă 15 h (CR 2008/23), p. 30, § 12.
19 Un accord de paix a été signé à Simla le 3 juillet 1972, et le Conseil de sécurité a pris note de la fin des hostilités dans sa résolution 307 (1971), dÚs la conclusion du cessez-le-feu.
20 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 11 mai 1973, dĂ©posĂ©e par le Pakistan contre lâInde, C.I.J. MĂ©moires, ProcĂšs de prisonniers de guerre pakistanais, p. 6.
21 Il est vrai que « [l]es diffĂ©rends portĂ©s devant la Cour, qui deviennent de ce fait des litiges soumis Ă sa juridiction, ne sont que trĂšs rarement identiques au diffĂ©rend rĂ©ellement existant entre deux Ătats » (E. Jouannet, « Le juge international face aux problĂšmes dâincohĂ©rence et dâinstabilitĂ© du droit international. Quelques rĂ©flexions Ă propos de lâarrĂȘt CIJ du 6 novembre 2003, Affaire des Plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres », RGDIP, 2004-4, p. 927). Cependant, la distorsion incontournable que gĂ©nĂšre par nature le prisme judiciaire tend Ă devenir, dans certaines espĂšces, un outil dĂ©libĂ©rĂ© de dĂ©tournement de la compĂ©tence du juge.
22 Art. XXXI du Traité américain de rÚglement pacifique (Pacte de Bogotå), signé le 30 avril 1948 à Bogotå, Recueil des Traités des Nations Unies, Vol. 30, p. 84.
23 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance prĂ©sentĂ©e par le gouvernement du Nicaragua le 25 juillet 1986, C.I.J. MĂ©moires, Affaire relative Ă des actions frontaliĂšres et transfrontaliĂšres (Nicaragua c. Honduras), p. 3.
24 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance prĂ©sentĂ©e par le gouvernement du Nicaragua le 25 juillet 1986, C.I.J. MĂ©moires, Affaire relative Ă des actions frontaliĂšres et transfrontaliĂšres (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), p. 3.
25 ComplĂ©ment du 12 mai 1999 Ă la requĂȘte dĂ©posĂ©e par la RFY contre le Royaume de Belgique (non publiĂ©) et ComplĂ©ment du 12 mai 1999 Ă la requĂȘte dĂ©posĂ©e par la RFY contre le Royaume des Pays-Bas (non publiĂ©). La compĂ©tence de la Cour Ă©tait envisagĂ©e par ces conventions comme portant respectivement sur « tous diffĂ©rends au sujet desquels les parties se contesteraient rĂ©ciproquement un droit » (Art. 4 de la convention de conciliation, de rĂšglement judiciaire et dâarbitrage, signĂ©e Ă Belgrade le 25 mars 1930 entre la Yougoslavie et la Belgique, Recueil des TraitĂ©s de la SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations, 1930, Vol. 106, p. 343, n° 2455) et sur « tous les litiges, de quelque nature quâils soient, portant sur un droit allĂ©guĂ© par une des Hautes Parties contractantes et contestĂ© par lâautre » (Art. 2 du traitĂ© de rĂšglement judiciaire, dâarbitrage et de conciliation, signĂ© Ă La Haye le 11 mars 1931 entre la Yougoslavie et les Pays-Bas, Recueil des TraitĂ©s de la SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations, 1932, Vol. 129, p. 90, n° 2952).
26 MĂ©moire du Nicaragua (questions de la compĂ©tence et de la recevabilitĂ©), C.I.J. MĂ©moires, ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, Vol. I, p. 403. Cette base de compĂ©tence nâavait pas Ă©tĂ© mentionnĂ©e dans la requĂȘte introductive dâinstance.
27 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 2 novembre 1992, prĂ©sentĂ©e par la RĂ©publique islamique dâIran contre les Ătats-Unis dâAmĂ©rique, pp. 5-6 (non publiĂ©).
28 RequĂȘte du Pakistan contre lâInde, op. cit., p. 7, § 11.
29 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 20 mars 1993, prĂ©sentĂ©e par la RĂ©publique de Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine contre la RFY, p. 1 (non publiĂ©).
30 Voy. par exemple : RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 29 avril 1999, dĂ©posĂ©e par la RFY contre le Royaume de Belgique, p. 4 (non publiĂ©).
31 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 2 juillet 1999, dĂ©posĂ©e par la RĂ©publique de Croatie contre la RFY, p. 2 (non publiĂ©).
32 Ă lâexception de la requĂȘte contre lâOuganda, cet Ătat ayant acceptĂ© la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour conformĂ©ment Ă lâarticle 36 § 2 du Statut, rendant non nĂ©cessaire lâĂ©tablissement de la compĂ©tence de la Cour au moyen dâune clause compromissoire.
33 Sur la stratĂ©gie, et le dĂ©sespoir, du requĂ©rant congolais en ce qui concerne lâĂ©tablissement de la compĂ©tence de la Cour, voy. F. Latty, « La Cour internationale de justice face aux tiraillements du droit international : les arrĂȘts dans les affaires des activitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (RDC c. Ouganda, 19 dĂ©cembre 2005 ; RDC c Rwanda, 3 fĂ©vrier 2006) », AFDI, 2005, pp. 209 et s. Pour une Ă©tude dĂ©taillĂ©e des diffĂ©rentes clauses compromissoires invoquĂ©es et leur rejet par la Cour, voy. F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans lâaffaire des ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (Nouvelle requĂȘte : 2002) (RĂ©publique dĂ©mocratique du Congo c. Rwanda) », AFDI, 2007, pp. 328-346.
34 Voir par exemple la requĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 23 juin 1999, dĂ©posĂ©e par la RDC contre la RĂ©publique du Burundi, pp. 8-9 (non publiĂ©). Les fondements sont identiques dans la requĂȘte formĂ©e Ă la mĂȘme date contre la RĂ©publique du Rwanda (non publiĂ©).
35 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance du 28 mai 2002, dĂ©posĂ©e par la RDC contre la RĂ©publique du Rwanda (deuxiĂšme requĂȘte), p. 18 (non publiĂ©).
36 ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requĂȘte: 2002), mesures conservatoires, op. cit., p. 242, § 62.
37 RequĂȘte de la RDC (RDC c. Rwanda, deuxiĂšme requĂȘte, 2002), op. cit., pp. 28 et s.
38 Sont ainsi visĂ©s les deux Pactes de 1966, la convention relative au statut de rĂ©fugiĂ© de 1951 et son protocole de 1967, la Charte africaine des droits de lâhomme et des peuples, la convention relative aux droits de lâenfant de 1989 et ses protocoles de 2002 relatifs respectivement Ă lâimplication dâenfants dans les conflits armĂ©s et Ă la vente dâenfant, la prostitution des enfants et la pornographie mettant en scĂšne des enfants. Le demandeur invoque Ă©galement la coutume internationale et les « principes gĂ©nĂ©raux de base du droit humanitaire » dĂ©gagĂ©s par la Cour dans lâaffaire Nicaragua. Enfin, dans une derniĂšre sĂ©rie, la RDC en appelle notamment Ă la DĂ©claration universelle de 1948, aux Conventions de GenĂšve de 1949 et Ă leurs protocoles de 1977.
39 C.I.J., Timor Oriental, arrĂȘt du 30 juin 1995, Recueil 1995, p. 102, § 29. Sur cet aspect de lâarrĂȘt, et notamment sur la transposition de la solution des normes erga omnes aux normes de jus cogens, voy. F. Latty, « La Cour internationale de justice face aux tiraillements du droit international⊠», op. cit., pp. 209-211.
40 Pour le commentaire de cet article : H. Ruiz Fabri, « Commentaire de lâarticle 66 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traitĂ©s », in O. Corten, P. Klein (Ă©ds), Commentaire des Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traitĂ©s, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2006, T. 3, pp. 2390-2427, et notamment pp. 2410-2414.
41 Sur ce point, voy. Y. Kerbrat, « De quelques aspects des procĂ©dures incidentes devant la Cour internationale de justice : Les ordonnances des 29 novembre 2001 et 10 juillet 2002 dans les affaires des activitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo », AFDI, 2002, p. 356 ; F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans lâaffaire des ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo⊠», op. cit., p. 336.
42 Une partie de la doctrine a dĂ©jĂ pu dĂ©plorer que certains acteurs juridiques internationaux soient tombĂ©s « sous le charme » de cette notion (M. J. Glennon, « De lâabsurditĂ© du droit impĂ©ratif (jus cogens) », RGDIP, 2006-3, p. 530), au dĂ©triment de sa nature et de sa portĂ©e (pour une illustration, voy. F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans lâaffaire des ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo⊠», op. cit., p. 336).
43 Sur ce point, voy. infra, Partie II, a.
44 RequĂȘte de la RFY contre la Belgique, op. cit., p. 5.
45 Les seules exceptions concernent soit des affaires ayant Ă©tĂ© rapidement radiĂ©es du rĂŽle (Congo c. Rwanda (premiĂšre requĂȘte) ; Congo c. Burundi ; Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), soit des usages de la force armĂ©e ayant cessĂ© dĂ©finitivement avant lâintroduction de lâinstance (RĂ©publique islamique dâIran c. Ătats-Unis dâAmĂ©rique ; Croatie c. RFY).
46 Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par le Nicaragua (le 9 avril 1984, C.I.J. Mémoires, Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, Vol. I, p. 29, § 10.
47 Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par la RDC (RDC c. Ouganda) le 19 juin 2000, p. 3, points 1) à 3) (non publié).
48 Pour une analyse des fondements de la compĂ©tence de la Cour au stade des mesures conservatoires, voy. L. Boisson de Chazournes, « Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans lâaffaire relative Ă lâapplication de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide », AFDI, 1993, pp. 516-525.
49 Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires prĂ©sentĂ©e par la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine le 20 mars 1993, pp. 5-6, § 14, points 2) Ă 6) (non publiĂ©). Sur le fondement de lâarticle 2, il est demandĂ© Ă la Cour dâenjoindre Ă la RFY de sâabstenir de tout soutien aux forces serbes de Bosnie et de renoncer elle-mĂȘme Ă lâemploi ou Ă la menace dâemploi de la force. Au titre de lâarticle 51, la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine vise Ă obtenir de la Cour la reconnaissance de son droit de lĂ©gitime dĂ©fense individuelle et collective, reconnaissance comportant aux termes de la demande la levĂ©e de lâembargo sur les armes imposĂ© par le Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ© (ce dernier point nâĂ©tant pas sans soulever de difficultĂ©s sur lâagencement des compĂ©tences respectives de la Cour et du Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ©, voy. note 77).
50 Idem, p. 5, § 14, point 1). Cette demande exige de la RFY la cessation de tous actes relevant du champ de la convention. Pourtant, lâobjet de cette requĂȘte prĂ©sente en pratique une grande proximitĂ© avec les demandes fondĂ©es sur le droit de la guerre. En effet, la cessation demandĂ©e au titre de la convention ne saurait tendre Ă une seule et irrĂ©elle suspension de lâintention gĂ©nocidaire. Ce sont donc encore les actes matĂ©riels de belligĂ©rance qui sont visĂ©s. Cependant, le caractĂšre gĂ©nocidaire de ces actes permet ici de les inscrire sans contradiction dans le champ de lâinstrument fondant la compĂ©tence de la Cour.
51 Sur les ordonnances de la Cour, voy. L. Boisson de Chazournes, « La Cour internationale de justice aux prises avec la crise du Kosovo : à propos de la demande en mesures conservatoires de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie », AFDI, 1999, pp. 453-471, et notamment pp. 456-459.
52 La demande, fondĂ©e sur lâarticle 2 § 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies, nâĂ©tait acceptable quâau regard des Ătats ayant souscrit Ă la clause de juridiction obligatoire de lâarticle 36 § 2 du Statut. Elle ne le serait devenue Ă lâĂ©gard des autres Ătats que dans lâhypothĂšse improbable dâune acceptation de la compĂ©tence de la Cour sur le fondement de lâarticle 38 § 5 du rĂšglement de la Cour. On ne peut que regretter la confusion entretenue, peut-ĂȘtre Ă dessein, par la RFY entre les diffĂ©rents fondements de ses requĂȘtes. Cette confusion conduit en effet Ă une Ă©trange, quoiquâopportune, forme de croisement entre les bases de compĂ©tences accessoires (article 38 § 5) et les demandes principales (jus ad bellum / jus in bello). Ce phĂ©nomĂšne est encore accentuĂ© par lâindistinction des requĂȘtes dirigĂ©es contre les diffĂ©rents membres de lâOTAN, en dĂ©pit dâun tissu conventionnel souvent trĂšs diffĂ©rent.
53 Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par la RFY (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Belgique) le 29 avril 1999, p. 14 (non publié).
54 Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires prĂ©sentĂ©e par la RDC (RDC c. Rwanda, deuxiĂšme requĂȘte) le 28 mai 2002, p. 26 (non publiĂ©).
55 Idem, p. 26.
56 Ibid., pp. 26-31.
57 Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par la Géorgie contre la Russie le 14 août 2008 (non publié).
58 Idem, p. 9, § 17, point b).
59 Ătablissant un parallĂšle avec le prĂ©cĂ©dent Serbe dans lâaffaire licĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force, lâopinion dissidente jointe Ă lâordonnance de la Cour du 15 octobre 2008 note que « les actions armĂ©es de la Russie aprĂšs le 8 aoĂ»t ne sauraient en elles-mĂȘmes constituer des actes de discrimination raciale » (op. cit., §§ 8-9).
60 Ibid., p. 9, § 17, point c). La formulation sera modifiée en sa forme dans la seconde version de la demande, présentée le 22 août 2008, p. 9, § 23, points a) et b).
61 Comme pourrait par exemple le laisser supposer le quasi dĂ©sintĂ©rĂȘt de la RFY au stade des exceptions prĂ©liminaires (mĂȘme si de nombreux facteurs expliquent son « absence totale dâesprit contentieux », voy. O. de Frouville, « Une harmonie dissonante de la justice internationale : les arrĂȘts de la Cour internationale de justice sur les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans lâaffaire relative Ă la LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force », AFDI, 2004, p. 344).
62 RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), op. cit., p. 6, §§ 14-22 ; RequĂȘte introductive dâinstance (Nicaragua c. Honduras), op. cit., p. 6, §§ 21-29.
63 RequĂȘte de la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine, op. cit.,, § 135 a).
64 Cette requĂȘte sera modifiĂ©e par la suite, supprimant lâensemble des demandes nâĂ©tant pas en lien direct avec la convention sur le gĂ©nocide.
65 RequĂȘte de la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine, op. cit., pt. 135 b).
66 Idem, pt. 135 c).
67 Ibid., pt. 135 d), g), h) et i).
68 Ibid., pt. 135 e), f), j) Ă o).
69 RequĂȘte prĂ©sentĂ©e par la RFY contre la Belgique, op. cit., p. 4, points 1) et 2).
70 Idem, points 3) Ă 7).
71 Ibid., point 8).
72 Voir par exemple la requĂȘte formĂ©e par la RDC contre le Burundi, op. cit., p. 14. Les griefs sont semblables envers le Rwanda et lâOuganda. Dans ce dernier cas, il faut noter que lâusage de ces instruments nâappelle aucune critique, la compĂ©tence de la Cour Ă©tant fondĂ©e sur lâarticle 36 § 2 du Statut. Il est seulement une nouvelle fois Ă regretter que les demandeurs traitent de maniĂšre similaire des affaires qui, quoi que connexes en faits, sâinscrivent en droit dans des relations trĂšs diffĂ©rentes (voy. note 52).
73 Idem.
74 Voir en ce sens les exceptions prĂ©liminaires prĂ©sentĂ©es par la RFY, le 1er septembre 2002, pp. 53-57 (non publiĂ©). Dans son arrĂȘt du 18 novembre 2008, la Cour a bornĂ© la question de sa compĂ©tence Ă lâĂ©tude de lâopposabilitĂ© de la convention gĂ©nocide au dĂ©fendeur. Lâappartenance des faits litigieux au champ de la convention nâayant pas fait lâobjet de contestations par la RFY, la Cour ne sâest pas prononcĂ©e sur ce point. Sur la question, plus prĂ©cise, de savoir si la communication dâinformation sur les disparus ou la restitution de biens culturels Ă©taient des remĂšdes entrant dans le champ de la convention gĂ©nocide, la Cour a estimĂ© que les remĂšdes Ă apporter dĂ©pendaient des conclusions auxquelles elle aboutirait lors du jugement au fond. Le contenu de ces demandes nâest alors « pas de nature Ă faire lâobjet dâune exception prĂ©liminaire » (C.I.J., Affaire relative Ă lâapplication de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide (Croatie c. Serbie), exceptions prĂ©liminaires, arrĂȘt du 18 novembre 2008, pp. 47-48, §§ 139 et 143 (non publiĂ©)).
75 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitaires⊠(Nicaragua c. Ătats-Unis d’AmĂ©rique), compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 437, § 100.
76 Raisons parmi lesquelles figure en bonne place, de maniĂšre quasi-systĂ©matique, lâinfĂ©rioritĂ© militaire des demandeurs. On relĂšvera par ailleurs que lâavĂšnement dâun accord de paix entre les parties ne semble pas devoir mettre un terme Ă une action engagĂ©e devant la Cour. Ainsi, la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine nâa pas retirĂ© sa requĂȘte aprĂšs la conclusion des Accords de Dayton en 1995 (sur cet aspect, voy. S. Maljean-Dubois, « Lâaffaire relative Ă lâapplication de la Convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide (Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine c. Yougoslavie), arrĂȘt du 11 juillet 1996, exceptions prĂ©liminaires », AFDI, 1996, p. 358). La Cour reste donc, mĂȘme dans cette hypothĂšse, un moyen complĂ©mentaire pour les protagonistes dâobtenir des compensations quâils ne sont pas parvenus Ă faire inscrire dans les rĂšglements diplomatiques.
77 Il faut en effet constater que, pour une large part des contentieux Ă©tudiĂ©s, le recours Ă lâorgane judiciaire des Nations Unies se pose en contrepoint dâun Ă©chec Ă obtenir lâappui du Conseil de SĂ©curitĂ©, quelles que soient les raisons de cet Ă©chec. Du point de vue du principe, la Cour eu lâoccasion dâaffirmer que lâintervention simultanĂ©e du Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ© dans un diffĂ©rend nâest pas un obstacle Ă la recevabilitĂ© de la requĂȘte (ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitaires⊠(Nicaragua c. Ătats-Unis d’AmĂ©rique), compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., pp. 433-436, §§ 92-98). Dâune part, la juridiction a rejetĂ© lâargument de lâexclusivitĂ© de lâintervention du Conseil en ce quâil « tend Ă transposer au plan international des notions internes de sĂ©paration des pouvoirs, alors que ces notions ne s’appliquent pas aux relations entre institutions internationales » (idem, p. 433 § 92). Dâautre part, elle a affirmĂ© que lâaction des deux institutions procĂ©dait de « fonctions distinctes mais complĂ©mentaires » (ibid., p. 435, § 95), validant ainsi lâidĂ©e dâun « parallĂ©lisme fonctionnel » (A. Pellet, « Le glaive et la balance », op. cit., p. 550). Toutefois, du point de vue de ses modalitĂ©s, cette solution ne va pas sans soulever certaines difficultĂ©s quant Ă lâarticulation des missions des deux institutions, et Ă lâautoritĂ© de leurs dĂ©cisions respectives. Le dĂ©fendeur amĂ©ricain a ainsi pu craindre, sans ĂȘtre suivi par les juges, que la Cour soit Ă©rigĂ©e en organe dâ « appel » des dĂ©cisions du Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ© (ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitaires⊠(Nicaragua c. Ătats-Unis d’AmĂ©rique), compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit.,, p. 436, § 98). Lâaffaire ayant opposĂ© la Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine Ă la RFY offre une illustration topique de cette hypothĂšse dâappel (voy. note 49). En pratique, ce nâest quâau prix de nombreuses prĂ©cautions que la Cour parvint Ă Ă©viter que ses arrĂȘts nâentrent en confrontation avec les dĂ©cisions du Conseil (sur ces diffĂ©rents aspects, voy. A.Pellet, « Le glaive et la balance », op. cit., pp. 545-550 ; L. Boisson de Chazournes, « Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans lâaffaire relative Ă lâapplication de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide », op. cit., pp. 534-536). De maniĂšre plus large, sur les conflits entre les questions de sĂ©curitĂ© collective et de responsabilitĂ© internationale, voy. Mathias Forteau, Droit de la sĂ©curitĂ© collective et droit de la responsabilitĂ© internationale, Paris, Pedone, 2006, 699 p.
78 Seules sept situations comportent des enseignements sur la maniĂšre dont la Cour a reçu les demandes des Ătats. Cinq ont connu pour les demandeurs une issue favorable. Les requĂȘtes de la RFY contre les membres de lâOTAN et de la RDC contre le Rwanda sont les seuls exemples dâincompĂ©tence. Concernant les autres cas, quatre ont Ă©tĂ© radiĂ©s du rĂŽle avant toute dĂ©cision sur la compĂ©tence, et deux nâont pas encore fait lâobjet dâune dĂ©cision dĂ©finitive de la Cour (sur lâarrĂȘt du 18 novembre 2008, voy. note 74).
79 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 427, § 81.
80 MĂ©moire soumis par le Rwanda (RDC c. Rwanda (premiĂšre requĂȘte)) le 21 avril 2000, p. 10, § 2.12 (non publiĂ©).
81 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 428, § 83.
82 C.I.J., Application de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide, exceptions prĂ©liminaires, arrĂȘt, Recueil 1996, p. 614, § 27. Pour une analyse de cette affaire et notamment de lâexistence dâun lien entre le diffĂ©rend soulevĂ© et la clause compromissoire invoquĂ©e : S. Maljean-Dubois, « Lâaffaire relative Ă lâapplication de la Convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocideâŠÂ», op. cit., p. 373-375.
83 Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, exceptions préliminaires, op. cit., p. 617, § 35.
84 Idem, pp. 619-620, § 38. La Cour fonde son raisonnement sur un argument combinant portĂ©e territoriale du traitĂ© de 1919 et droit des successions aux traitĂ©s internationaux. Le traitĂ© des minoritĂ©s concernait en effet uniquement la protection de celles-ci sur le territoire propre de lâĂtat signataire. Par jeu de successions, la RFY ne serait donc tenue au respect des clauses de ce traitĂ© que sur la portion de territoire Ă©tant aujourdâhui la sienne, et non pour le territoire Yougoslave de lâĂ©poque. La Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine nâayant invoquĂ© aucun manquement Ă la protection des minoritĂ©s situĂ©es en RFY, la Cour ne peut caractĂ©riser un lien entre les faits allĂ©guĂ©s et le traitĂ©.
85 ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requĂȘte: 2002), mesures conservatoires, op. cit., p. 247, § 79.
86 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 428, § 83.
87 RequĂȘte de la RĂ©publique islamique dâIran, op. cit., p. 5. LâallĂ©gation de violation du but et de lâobjet sera nuancĂ©e dans la suite de la procĂ©dure, lâIran limitant finalement sa requĂȘte Ă la violation dâarticles prĂ©cisĂ©ment identifiĂ©s du traitĂ©.
88 C.I.J., Plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres (RĂ©publique islamique d’Iran c. Ătats-Unis d’AmĂ©rique), exceptions prĂ©liminaires, arrĂȘt, Recueil 1996, p. 809, § 15.
89 Idem, p. 815, § 31.
90 Ibid., p. 820, § 52.
91 Ibid., p. 813, § 28.
92 Pour une analyse de cet arrĂȘt, et des contorsions logiques auxquelles la Cour doit recourir pour se saisir de lâaspect « emploi de la force » dâun diffĂ©rend fondĂ© sur un traitĂ© essentiellement commercial, voy. P. dâArgent, « Du commerce Ă lâemploi de la force : lâaffaire des plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres (arrĂȘt sur le fond) », AFDI, 2003, pp. 266-289, et notamment pp. 270-275. Voy. Ă©galement , E. Jouannet, « Le juge international face aux problĂšmes dâincohĂ©rence et dâinstabilitĂ© du droit international⊠», op. cit., p. 927.
93 Le fondement de la convention sur le gĂ©nocide sera complĂ©tĂ© dans certaines des requĂȘtes par des conventions spĂ©cifiques ou encore par lâinvocation dâune acceptation de la compĂ©tence de la Cour au titre de lâarticle 36 § 2 du statut, sans davantage de succĂšs pour le demandeur (sur cet aspect, voy. note 52).
94 LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures conservatoires, op. cit., p. 136, § 35. Il convient de ce point de vue dâisoler les cas des Ătats-unis et de lâEspagne, la Cour ayant Ă©tĂ© amenĂ©e Ă se considĂ©rer manifestement incompĂ©tente du fait de lâexistence de rĂ©serves Ă la clause compromissoire de cette convention. Ces rĂ©serves, dont la compatibilitĂ© avec la convention nâa pas Ă©tĂ© contestĂ©e, a conduit la juridiction Ă rayer les affaires de son rĂŽle (voy. C.I.J., LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Ătats-Unis dâAmĂ©rique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, Recueil 1999, p. 924, § 25 et C.I.J., LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, Recueil 1999, p. 771, § 25).
95 LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures conservatoires, op. cit., p. 138, § 40.
96 Idem, p. 138, § 40.
97 Ibid., p. 138, § 41.
98 Ibid., p. 136, § 35.
99 Ibid., p. 136, §§ 34-35.
100 Ibid., p. 136, § 35.
101 MĂ©moire relatif Ă la compĂ©tence de la Cour soumis par le Rwanda (RDC c. Rwanda (deuxiĂšme requĂȘte)) le 20 janvier 2003, p. 10 et s. LâinopposabilitĂ© des instruments invoquĂ©s par la RDC pouvait rĂ©sulter soit de rĂ©serves Ă©cartant la compĂ©tence de la Cour (cas de la convention sur la discrimination raciale, mĂ©moire, p. 11), soit simplement de lâabsence totale de participation du dĂ©fendeur Ă la convention (cas des conventions sur la torture et sur le gĂ©nocide, mĂ©moire, p. 10 et 13). Dâautres conventions sont Ă©cartĂ©es en raison du non respect des conditions et procĂ©dures prĂ©alables Ă la saisine de la Cour (convention sur lâĂ©limination de la discrimination Ă lâĂ©gard des femmes, convention Unesco, convention OMS, mĂ©moire, pp. 16 et s.) ; sur ce dernier aspect voy. note 13.
102 Idem, p. 35, § 3.76.
103 ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requĂȘte: 2002), mesures conservatoires, op. cit., p. 246, § 73.
104 Idem, p. 248, § 83.
105 Mémoire du Nicaragua (questions de la compétence et de la recevabilité), op. cit., p. 405, § 174.
106 C.P.J.I, Usine de Chorzów, série A, n° 17, p. 63.
107 C.I.J., Actions armĂ©es transfrontaliĂšres (Nicaragua c. Honduras), compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, arrĂȘt, Recueil 1988, p. 91, § 53.
108 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 428, § 82.
109 C.I.J., Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Ătats-Unis Ă TĂ©hĂ©ran, Recueil 1981, p. 19, § 36.
110 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 439, § 105.
111 Les consĂ©quences de cette altĂ©ration ont Ă©tĂ© mises en lumiĂšre au Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ© lors des dĂ©bats relatifs Ă lâarrĂȘt du 27 juin 1986. Le Nicaragua avait demandĂ© au Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ© dâexaminer le diffĂ©rend lâopposant aux Ătats-Unis et « qui avait fait lâobjet dâun arrĂȘt de la Cour » (lettre du 22 juillet 1986, S/18230). Le reprĂ©sentant britannique prit soin de distinguer le diffĂ©rend gĂ©nĂ©ral qui opposait les deux Ătats de celui, plus rĂ©duit, qui avait Ă©tĂ© tranchĂ© par la Cour. Il souligna ainsi que la lettre du Nicaragua excĂ©dait le dispositif de lâarrĂȘt et portait sur le diffĂ©rend en son entier. Il ajouta que « la Cour internationale de Justice nâ[avait] pas eu Ă connaĂźtre des dĂ©tails de lâensemble du problĂšme d’AmĂ©rique centrale » et quâ« il [Ă©tait] inappropriĂ© dâessayer de retenir, pour examen sĂ©parĂ©, une toute petite partie du problĂšme global, comme on [essayait] de le faire dans la lettre du Nicaragua [âŠ] » (ProcĂšs verbal de la 2704Ăšme sĂ©ance, S/PV.2704, pp. 47-48).
112 J. Verhoeven, op. cit., pp. 1181- 1182.
113 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 431, § 89.
114 Exceptions prĂ©liminaires prĂ©sentĂ©es par les Ătats-Unis le 16 dĂ©cembre 1993, p. 2, § 5-6 (non publiĂ©).
115 Actions armées transfrontaliÚres (Nicaragua c. Honduras), compétence et recevabilité, op. cit., p. 91, § 51. Sur les mobiles de la saisine, voy. M. Forteau, « La saisine des juridictions internationales⊠», op. cit., p. 34.
116 Idem, p. 91, § 52.
117 Quand il ne conduit pas la Cour Ă outrepasser dĂ©libĂ©rĂ©ment sa compĂ©tence. La doctrine a ainsi pu constater un « contournement par la Cour de lâobstacle de son incompĂ©tence » (Y. Kerbrat, « De quelques aspects des procĂ©dures incidentes devant la Cour internationale de JusticeâŠÂ», op. cit., p. 358 et s.) au moyen dâobiter dicta constituant de vĂ©ritables « sentences en passant » (idem). Cette tendance avait dĂ©jĂ Ă©tĂ© mise en lumiĂšre au sujet des mesures conservatoires demandĂ©es par la RFY en 1999, voy. L. Boisson de Chazournes, « La Cour internationale de justice aux prises avec la crise du Kosovo⊠», op. cit., pp. 463-465. Pour une analyse de cet usage des motifs par la Cour : G. Cahin, « La motivation des dĂ©cisions de la Cour internationale de justice », in H. Ruiz Fabri et J.-M. Sorel, La motivation des dĂ©cisions des juridictions internationales, Paris, Pedone, 2008, pp. 1-90, et notamment pp. 81-90.
118 ActivitĂ©s militaires et paramilitairesâŠ, compĂ©tence et recevabilitĂ©, op. cit., p. 434, § 94.
119 Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, exceptions préliminaires, op. cit., p. 620, § 39.
120 Application de la convention internationale sur lâĂ©limination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, op. cit., § 112.
121 C.I.J., ConsĂ©quences juridiques de lâĂ©dification dâun mur dans le territoire palestinien occupĂ©, avis consultatif, Recueil 2004, p. 178, §§ 105-106 ; C.I.J., LicĂ©itĂ© de la menace ou de lâemploi d’armes nuclĂ©aires, avis consultatif, Recueil 1996, p. 239, §§ 24-25.
122 Pour une analyse des rapports entre droits de lâhomme et droit humanitaire, voy. S. Szurek, « Droit international des droits de lâhomme et droit international humanitaire : entre guerre et paix », in FrontiĂšres du droit, critique des droits, billets dâhumeur en lâhonneur de DaniĂšle Lochak, Paris, LGDJ, 2007, pp. 195-199.
123 La GĂ©orgie et la Russie sont parties aux Conventions de GenĂšve de 1949, respectivement depuis le 14 septembre 1993 et le 10 mai 1954. Aucune rĂ©serve ne fait obstacle Ă lâapplication de ces instruments Ă la situation.
124 Il est vrai que la complexitĂ© de la situation rend Ă la fois difficile et fluctuante la qualification dâune situation de conflit armĂ© en lâespĂšce. Des premiĂšres interventions russes pendant la phase dâindĂ©pendance au dĂ©but des annĂ©es 90 Ă lâintervention de lâĂ©tĂ© 2008, lâhistoire de la rĂ©gion est faite de tensions entre la GĂ©orgie et ses provinces, sous la surveillance, constante et institutionnalisĂ©e, de troupes russes. Il est difficilement contestable que lâintervention du mois dâaoĂ»t 2008 constitue un conflit armĂ© international : la Russie est en effet intervenue, quelle que soit la cause de cette intervention, en tant quâĂtat Ă lâencontre dâun autre Ătat souverain. Les seuils dâapplication du droit humanitaire ont dĂšs lors Ă©tĂ© franchis, sinon par lâexistence dâune « guerre » au sens classique du droit international, au moins par lâavĂšnement dâun « conflit armĂ© surgissant entre deux ou plusieurs des Hautes Parties contractantes » au sens des articles 2 communs aux conventions de 1949. Lâexistence dâun conflit armĂ© interne paraĂźt de mĂȘme caractĂ©risĂ©e jusquâĂ la signature des accords de Sotchi (avec les OssĂštes) du 25 juin 1992 et de Moscou (avec les Abkhazes) le 14 mai 1994. La dĂ©termination de la nature de la situation dans lâintervalle, c’est-Ă -dire entre 1994 et 2008, est plus difficile. LâimprĂ©cision du droit conventionnel humanitaire est grande et la jurisprudence, notamment des tribunaux pĂ©naux internationaux, trĂšs peu prĂ©cise sur les critĂšres Ă employer pour identifier un conflit armĂ© interne, distinct de simples « situations de tensions internes, de troubles intĂ©rieurs, comme les Ă©meutes, les actes isolĂ©s et sporadiques de violence et autres actes analogues, qui ne sont pas considĂ©rĂ©s comme des conflits armĂ©s » (second Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de GenĂšve relatif Ă la protection de victimes de conflits non internationaux, 8 juin 1977, article 1 § 2). Il convient de simplement constater ici que la question gĂ©orgienne est restĂ©e inscrite Ă lâordre du jour du Conseil de sĂ©curitĂ©, qui continuait, avant mĂȘme les Ă©vĂšnements de 2008, de parler de « sĂ©paration des forces », de « cessez-le-feu » et de « conflit » (RĂ©solution 1808, 15 avril 2008). Il ne fait aucun doute que la Cour internationale de justice aura une mission ardue lorsquâelle tentera de qualifier, pour chacun des moments de lâaffaire, sâil existe une situation juridique de conflit armĂ© entraĂźnant lâapplication du droit humanitaire.
Informations
Référence :
R. Le Boeuf, « La saisine de la Cour internationale de Justice pour faits de guerre », Revue belge de droit international, 2009, pp. 53-77.
trad. : R. Le Boeuf, « The International Court of Justice and Acts of War » (english mirror version), Documentsdedroitinternational.fr, Revue belge de droit international, 2009, pp. 53-77.
Important note :
This is an english mirror of the french version of the article, automatically translated. The translation has not been corrected. It is given as such, as an introduction to the french version. Online version of the text may differ from the final edited version. For a reliable quotation, please refer to the published version of the journal.
Summary
The International Court of Justice is increasingly called upon to deal with facts relating to the use of force. However, it appears that the combination of its procedural rules and certain « loopholes » in the law of war deprive it of the essential rules applicable to situations of this type. This state of the law forces applicants to resort to legal instruments unrelated to the facts they wish to bring before the Court, and leads the Court to rule on cases that are truncated of their essential characteristics. The result is that the entire judicial debate is displaced, as illustrated, for example, by the dispute between Georgia and Russia.
International Court of Justice and Acts of War
More than twenty cases relating to the use of force have been brought before the International Court of Justice since it was established1 . The Georgian application of 12 August 2008 is the latest example of recourse to an inter-state judge in a context of active hostilities. While submitting a dispute of this nature to judicial settlement may have raised a number of difficulties at the time2 , it has now been established that the presence of « serious elements of the use of force »3 is not an obstacle to the Court’s jurisdiction. This question, which has already been the subject of much thought4 , does not need to be revisited. However, the use of the Court’s jurisdiction reveals certain tendencies on the part of States which it is important to highlight, in that they involve a form of circumvention of the rules of jurisdiction established by the Court’s Statute. Georgia’s referral to the Court at5 provides a topical illustration of this situation. It should be remembered at the outset that the presence of acts of war in a dispute submitted to the Court has no effect on the conditions governing its referral: neither the seriousness of the acts in question nor their urgency detract from the procedural rigour. Thus, even if the Court declares itself « deeply concerned by the human tragedy, the loss of human life and the terrible suffering [âŠ] which form the backdrop to the dispute »6 , it cannot do without the consent of the States involved7 . Establishing this jurisdiction may raise only relative difficulties â common to other types of dispute â when the basis for the referral is found in Article 36(2) of the Statute or in an ad hoc agreement by the respondent8 . The situation is different when recourse is had to Article 36(1), which requires the applicant State to prove that it has a clause specifically providing for the Court’s jurisdiction. This is the only aspect to which we will turn our attention.
At first glance, the norms of the law of war would appear to be perfectly capable of justifying a claim for violation before the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. However, a quick review of the grounds of jurisdiction invoked by States in order to bring a case before the Court shows that, while these rules have indeed been the basis for many applications on the merits by States, they have never been used to found the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 36 § 1. This is simply because no instrument in this field contains an arbitration clause9 . A State faced with the use of force must therefore base its referral on instruments outside the corpus of the law of war. The entire judicial debate is then shifted to areas that are completely at odds with the original nature of the dispute.
Georgia’s application falls into this category. The applicant asked the Court to declare « that the Russian Federation [âŠ] has violated its obligations under CERD10 « 11 . The use of a convention whose purpose is to combat racial discrimination as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in a case essentially concerning the use of force is surprising. Although the Court ultimately upheld its prima facie jurisdiction at the interim stage of this case12 , seven of its fifteen judges disassociated themselves from the decision, taking the view that :
It is « curious, to say the least, that Georgia, which traces the alleged acts of racial discrimination committed by Russia in violation of the ICERD back to the early 1990s, should have waited for the armed conflict in which it was a party with Russia [âŠ] before immediately bringing before the Court a dispute relating to the application of that Convention »13 .
Filed just a few days after the outbreak of fighting in the summer of 2008, the application clearly targets acts of war committed by the respondent, even if it includes elements predating the Russian intervention. More than the context, it is the demands formulated by Georgia in its application that lead one to see in the dispute submitted to the Court anything other than a case of racial discrimination14 : a first demand is for the cessation of hostilities by Russia and the withdrawal of its troops15 , another for the non-recognition of the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia16 , and a third for the restoration of Georgian authority over these regions17 . Although more in line with the 1965 Convention, the other requests appear secondary, and the Russian defence does not fail to denounce a « cosmetic sprinkling [which] is obviously not sufficient to alter the nature of the request »18 .
The attempt is not new. As early as 1973, the beginnings of a discrepancy between the ends pursued and the means adopted could be observed in the application filed by Pakistan against India. This application essentially concerned the fate and repatriation of prisoners of war held in India despite the cessation of hostilities19 . The unilateral suspension of the repatriation of prisoners constituted, according to the application20 , a violation of the IIIĂšme and IVĂšme Geneva Conventions. However, it was Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide Convention) that was invoked as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the artifice was only partial, since India had justified the fate of the prisoners by its desire to have them tried, in particular, for crimes of genocide. So there was indeed a dispute between India and Pakistan over the application of the Genocide Convention, and although the dispute over the Genocide Convention was only incidental to the main issue of the fate of the POWs, the two issues were very closely intertwined, indeed ultimately inseparable. In subsequent cases, however, the systematic transposition of disputes relating to acts of war into the scope of other instruments gave the referrals an alternatively artificial or instrumental turn.
This practice, which has been constant since the Court’s earliest days in the field of armed conflict, is not destined to be abandoned. For the applicant, it is the ultimate palliative for what, from his point of view, appears to be a gap in the Convention. However, this expedient raises serious difficulties. Difficulties of principle, firstly, in that the purpose of the procedure is to give the Court jurisdiction to rule on situations that in principle fall outside its jurisdiction. Secondly, there are difficulties of application, as the Court’s discourse is bound to be distorted or truncated21 by referrals using inappropriate tools and shedding only partial light on the truth. The ever-increasing number of cases brought before the Court concerning acts of war requires an assessment of the phenomenon. Above all, it now provides a sufficient number of cases to draw up a faithful sketch of State practice (I), as well as its reception by the Court (II).
I â Qualification of acts of war in state applications
States have a tangible difficulty in finding an instrument that is in force between the plaintiff and the defendant, contains an arbitration clause and relates to the dispute submitted to the Court. Clearly, the first two parameters are not susceptible of degree. The only key that claimants can use to open the door to the international courtroom is therefore the one relating to the conformity of the subject matter of the dispute with that of the convention in question. The desire of States to have recourse to a jurisdictional body to ensure their political and territorial integrity leads them to invoke, as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, a patchwork of conventions that bear only an imperfect relationship to the real nature of the conflict. An empirical analysis should therefore be made of the formal instruments used to date by States to establish the Court’s jurisdiction (a). It will then be possible to compare these instruments with the reality of the measures expected by States (b).
A â The diversity of jurisdictional bases invoked
While the absence of arbitration clauses in conventions relating to the law of war should result in a dearth of arguments on the part of claimants, the latter do not hesitate, in their claims, to multiply the legal bases of their actions.
Conventional law -. Some of the conventions invoked deserve only passing attention, as they do not pose any real difficulties. This is particularly the case with judicial settlement agreements, i.e. agreements establishing between the parties a general acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. The Pact of BogotĂĄ, which provided for jurisdiction « in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them »22 , was used in cases between Nicaragua and Honduras23 and Costa Rica24 . It was the same type of instrument that enabled the FRY to supplement â unsuccessfully for other reasons â the applications lodged against Belgium and the Netherlands in 199925 .
The scope of arbitration clauses is generally much more limited and, to paraphrase the established formulae, is confined to establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over disputes relating to the application and interpretation of the treaty in which they are inserted.
Treaties of friendship have thus provided the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction on two occasions. In the Nicaragua case, the plaintiff invoked â in addition to the United States’ bitterly contested subscription to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction â a 1956 treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, which provided for the jurisdiction of the International Court in the event of a dispute relating to its application26 . The Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Consular Rights will also serve as the basis for Iran’s action against the United States in the Oil Platforms case27 .
Other conventions, with a much narrower scope, have also been used by States. Although they do not directly concern acts of war, these instruments generally cover situations that are close to such acts, from which the claimants intend to benefit. Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has thus become the cornerstone of the Court’s jurisdiction over acts of war. This text was used by Pakistan against India in 1973 to support claims relating to prisoners of war28 , by Bosnia-Herzegovina against the FRY in 199329 , by the FRY against the Member States of NATO in 199930 , by Croatia against the FRY31 , and finally by the Congo in its applications of 1999 and 200232 . Until recently, Article IX of the Genocide Convention was the only special arbitration clause to provide a basis for the Court’s action, but since 1999 it has faced increasingly prolific competition. The mere presence of such a clause now seems sufficient to legitimise in the minds of the applicants the invocation of a treaty to establish the Court’s jurisdiction in cases of use of force, without regard to its actual substantive content.
The initiator of this approach was the Congo33 : unable to base the Court’s jurisdiction over acts committed on its territory by Burundi and Rwanda on any basis other than the illusory Rule 38 § 5 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, this applicant simultaneously invoked Articles 30 and 14 of the 1984 New York Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation34 . The phenomenon became more pronounced. Boldly, it became caricatured in the application reintroduced against Rwanda in 2002. More than ten arbitration clauses were invoked simultaneously. In addition to the 1984 New York Convention and the 1971 Montreal Convention, which had already been invoked in the 1999 application, this new application invoked the 1979 Convention on Discrimination against Women, the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on Genocide, the Constitution of the World Health Organisation and the Unesco Statute35 , to which were added the 1947 United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies and the Headquarters Agreement between the DRC and MONUC of 4 May 200036. The Congolese application did not stop there: in order to complete the partial picture that its bundle of treaties was intended to paint of the conflict pitting it against Rwanda, the Congo added to the application a long series of conventions to which its adversary was not even a party, but which it was, according to the applicant, obliged to respect by virtue of the imperative nature of their content37 . These included international and regional conventions on human rights and the laws of war38 .
Beyond conventional law? -. However, jus cogens cannot in itself confer jurisdiction on the Court, and the peremptory nature of the norm to be protected does not imply compulsory jurisdiction for the Court39 . In order to justify its recourse to peremptory norms before the Court, the DRC invoked, rather unusually, Article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties40 . This article gives the Court jurisdiction over any « dispute concerning the application or interpretation of Articles 53 or 64 » of the Convention. However, although these two articles have an indisputable link with jus cogens norms, they are concerned solely with the invalidity of treaties and do not in any way allow a State to be condemned for violating, even seriously, a peremptory norm41 . The Congo’s attempt displaces the recognised functions of jus cogens: as a simple element of contractual technique, this concept can only disappoint those who, elevating it to the status of a myth42 , attempt to extend it beyond its natural limits.
The Congo’s approach is symptomatic of the desperate nature of the action taken by applicants required to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over acts of war. It bears witness to the frustration felt by certain States which, despite having their rights protected by the most essential instruments of international law, are unable to have their violations sanctioned before the judicial body of the United Nations. The number and diversity of the conventions in question illustrate the truly contingent nature of their use. These instruments are used only insofar as they make it possible to establish the Court’s jurisdiction, regardless of their substantive content.
B â Uniform objectives
The grounds invoked by States are therefore extremely varied, and the use of force may be presented as an infringement of a vague treaty declaration of friendship43 or as a violation of the right to work44 of the citizens of the requesting State. The diversity of legal bases does not, however, reflect the objectives that really drive the applications. From this point of view, the applicants’ expectations are perfectly unambiguous and the multiple violations alleged to establish the Court’s jurisdiction are ultimately based on common requirements.
Applications for precautionary measures. Even more than applications on the merits, requests for precautionary measures give a precise idea of the motivation of applicants faced with the use of force. Two observations emerge from a study of these applications. The first, quantitative, is the almost systematic nature of such requests45 . The second, qualitative, confirms the unambiguous nature of the measures proposed. With the exception of the case of the trial of the Pakistani prisoners of war, the aim is always to obtain an injunction from the Court to cease the use of force.
In the dispute with the United States, Nicaragua asked the Court to rule, as a protective measure, that :
« the United States should immediately cease and desist from providing, directly or indirectly, any support [âŠ] and from any military and paramilitary activities [âŠ] and from any other use or threat of force in its relations with Nicaragua »46 .
The same request was made in the application lodged by the DRC against Uganda in 1999, seeking the withdrawal of troops, the immediate cessation of fighting and assistance to entities fighting against the Congolese Government47 . Insofar as they are based on a general acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by the respondent under Article 36 § 2 of the Statute, the conclusions of these applications seeking the application of the law of the Charter and general international law do not raise any problem of principle. The situation is very different when the Court’s jurisdiction is established on the basis of an arbitration clause excluding those rules from the scope of the case.
The applicants therefore paid very little attention to the discrepancy between the content of the conventions they invoked as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction and the measures they requested. In its 1993 application, although the Court’s jurisdiction was based principally on Article IX of the Genocide Convention48 , Bosnia-Herzegovina based five of its six applications for interim measures on the law of the Charter, and more specifically on Articles 2 and 51 thereof49 . Only one application relates to the Genocide Convention50 . It was also a measure of pure jus ad bellum that the FRY requested as a precautionary measure in 1999, in the case that pitted it against the members of NATO51 . Without even pretending to place its application within the jurisdiction of the Court52 , the applicant this time merely requested that each defendant be called upon to « cease immediately the use of force and to refrain from any act constituting a threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia »53 .
The most recent applications to the Court concerning the use of force bear witness to an evolution. States are taking a more subtle approach to obtaining a cessation of hostilities from the Court, and their requests are presented in a more indirect manner. This can be seen in the Congo’s application in 2002. The applicant’s objective remains to obtain from the Court the « cessation of the war of aggression »54 of which it claims to be a victim. However, this cessation is no longer referred to as such. It is referred to only insofar as the war is « the source and cause of all the massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law »55 , and insofar as it is the basis for all the other violations listed in the application56 . The war is thus presented as an aggregate of distinct violations, which, although it cannot be the subject of an application as a whole, can be broken down into a series of unlawful acts in respect of which the Court’s jurisdiction is established.
The disjunction between the war and its effects continues to fuel Georgia’s arguments. The initial application for provisional measures57 is strictly confined to requiring Russia to cease its violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which serves as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Georgia’s request therefore presupposes only that Russia abstain « from any and all conduct that could result, directly or indirectly, in any form of ethnic discrimination by its armed forces »58 . It is therefore the discriminatory use of force by the Russian armies against the « ethnic Georgians » that is the subject of the application, and not the principle of the use of force itself. However, the distinction between friend and foe, which is inherent in a situation of war, can always be reduced, in the final analysis, to ethnic or national discrimination prohibited by the Convention. It is therefore the conduct of warfare that is rendered impossible and, through the accusation of discrimination, the use of force that is targeted59 . The Georgian applicant proceeded in the same way with regard to the request for compliance with the rules of jus in bello. Under the terms of this request, the Russian Federation must :
« immediately cease and desist from discriminatory violations of the human rights of ethnic Georgians, including attacks against civilians and civilian objects, murder, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian assistance, extensive pillage and destruction of towns and villages »60 .
The lexicon and content of the application undoubtedly borrow from humanitarian law. However, by identifying the victims as « ethnic Georgians », the applicant reminds the Court that the dispute is posed in terms of discrimination.
This attempt to obtain a decision from the Court on an issue that is a priori outside the scope of the limited dispute submitted to it is, in many respects, reminiscent of the practice of the ECHR and amounts, mutatis mutandis, to establishing the jurisdiction of the Court « by ricochet ». State practice in relation to referrals tends to separate as far as possible questions of jurisdiction from those of substance. The basis of jurisdiction chosen to establish the Court’s jurisdiction therefore has no real impact on the content of the provisional measures requested. The urgency felt by the applicant to halt the progress of its adversary justifies any means capable of leading the Court to order, even if only provisionally, the cessation of hostilities.
The main dispute -. The question that arises is whether or not the provisional phase, and the Court’s eventual order for the cessation of military operations, exhaust the litigation61 . In practice, it seems that the applications in the main proceedings largely overlap with those made on a precautionary basis, and are essentially aimed at obtaining definitive confirmation of the provisional measures. The essential distinguishing feature between the two phases is that, in addition to the claim for cessation of the unlawful act, there is also a claim for compensation for the damage suffered. Questions of jurisdiction do not disappear, however, and the debate may even intensify, with the Court no longer satisfied with a simple prima facie jurisdiction.
The charges relating to the use of force are thus maintained in the main proceedings. These claims vary according to the specific features of each conflict: for example, interference in internal affairs, attacks on the integrity of citizens and attacks on the free movement of maritime traffic are alleged in Nicaragua’s applications against the United States, Honduras and Costa Rica62 . In addition to the demands for the cessation of acts of genocide63 and the use of force, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s initial application64 also concerns violations of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977, as well as the fundamental and customary principles of the law of war65 , i.e. most of the rules of jus in bello. It also refers to various instruments for the protection of human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of 194866 , as well as general international law67 and the Charter of the United Nations68 . The FRY’s application in the main proceedings covers both the use of force itself (including interference in internal affairs)69 and the manner in which it was used (non-discrimination against the civilian population, protection of cultural property in wartime, weapons causing superfluous injury, damage to the environment)70 . The claim also relates to the violation of human rights, including in particular the right to life, to work, to information and to healthcare71 . The only point relating to the qualification of genocide is placed tenth in the application, after even the violation of the prohibition on obstructing free movement on watercourses. The DRC’s application also alleges violations of the principle prohibiting the use of force, the Geneva Conventions and the main general human rights instruments72 . The allegations of torture and violations of air safety73 , which form the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, are still only of very low rank.
Finally, two cases differ in that they do not have as their main object the cessation of the use of force â this having ceased at the time of the application. Nevertheless, although the applications do not seek to put an end to the unlawful use of force, this issue remains at the heart of the claims. In the Platforms case, Iran is seeking reparation for military attacks. And while Croatia’s claim appears to be purely based on elements outside the Genocide Convention, its demands for reparation give off a strange whiff of jus in bello. The restitution of cultural property and information about the missing are two measures that traditionally come under the law of war74 .
To conclude more generally on the purpose of applications submitted to the Court in relation to acts of war, it should be noted that while « the Court is not asked to put an end to the conflict by the mere power of words »75 , the aim pursued by States is indeed to obtain from the Court a definitive resolution of the conflict. If the conflict is ongoing, the application seeks to put an end to its military manifestations. If it has ended, the claim seeks compensation for the damage caused by past operations. The claimants then project onto the decisions of the International Court of Justice the functions of traditional instruments for restoring peace â such as cease-fires and peace agreements â which, for various reasons76 , they have been unable to get their adversary to adopt. Nor does this practice fail to reveal, in negative form, the positions adopted â or concealed â by the Security Council to the detriment of the plaintiffs77 .
II â The Court’s acceptance of these qualifications
The disjunction between the basis of jurisdiction invoked and the objectives pursued by the States is the most striking feature of their referral practice. The question is therefore how the Court deals with applications where the substantive claims have only a questionable link with the legal standard on which its jurisdiction is based. In the end, there have been few judgments in this area78 . However, it is already possible to discern from this case-law the essential features of the Court’s assessment of States’ characterisations of acts of war.
The practice of disconnecting the substance of the debate from the basis of the judge’s jurisdiction was thus denounced very early on by the defendants. As early as the Nicaragua case, the United States highlighted the need for a link between the facts that gave rise to the application and the basis of jurisdiction invoked to establish the Court’s jurisdiction. The disputed basis was the Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce concluded between the parties in 1956. The United States argued that there must be a « reasonable relationship »79 between the alleged basis of jurisdiction and the claims before the Court. In other words, the facts in dispute had to be capable of classification as falling within the scope of the treaty. This relationship, according to the objection raised, was lacking in the present case. This concept of a « reasonable report » was later adopted by the United States in the Oil Platforms case, and by Rwanda in the first dispute with the Congo80 .
The argument is easily understood. Indeed, not to require a link between the subject matter to which the arbitration clause applies and the nature of the dispute would have contradicted both the letter and the spirit of treaties containing such clauses. Indeed, it was on the basis of the very terms of the clause contained in the 1956 Treaty that the Court adopted the argument, replacing the idea of a « reasonable relationship » with that of the existence of « a dispute between the parties, in particular as to the ‘interpretation or application’ of the treaty »81 . The wording used in the case in point was slightly modified and became a position of principle from 1993 onwards, with the Court henceforth affirming the need to establish between the parties « the existence of a dispute falling within the provisions of the Convention »82 .
However, the principle of requiring a link does not mean that it is simple to implement. The link proposed by the States may simply not exist (A). Even if it is proven to exist, it may still reveal only a very partial, and therefore distorted, picture of the reality before the Court (B).
A â The requirement of a link between the characterisation invoked and the fact in question
The question of the existence of a « link » between the facts submitted to the Court for judgment and its jurisdiction has been raised on numerous occasions, to the extent that some States have deplored « sterile controversies between the parties as to whether or not [conduct] is ‘sufficiently directly related’ to the Convention »83 . However, there is often nothing dilatory about disputing this link. The Court may simply find that there is no link on the basis of the evidence before it, but it may still require the judges to deconstruct the fiction put forward by the applicants.
The existence of a link -. The need for a link leads the Court to decline jurisdiction when instruments unrelated to the dispute submitted are at stake. This requirement led it, for example, in the case brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, to disregard the Treaty on the Protection of Minorities concluded after the First World War, in the absence of a Bosnian claim falling within the territorial scope of the treaty84 . The same lack of a claim linked to the text invoked led the Court to reject its jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention on Aviation Safety in the case brought by the DRC against Rwanda. The Convention on Discrimination against Women was similarly dismissed in the same case, as the applicant had not « specified which of the rights protected by that Convention had been infringed by Rwanda »85 . In these different examples, it is a manifest lack of dispute that leads the Court not to accept jurisdiction.
But the absence of a link may also be less obvious, particularly when States seek to include their dispute in the very general formulations that often characterise the opening lines of international treaties. In such cases, it is the lack of normative value of the allegedly violated text that excludes the dispute from the scope of the convention and precludes the Court’s jurisdiction. The traditional formulas of diplomacy â eternal peace and sincere friendship â then reveal both their emptiness and their inability to provide a basis for action. From this point of view, the Court seems to have hardened its position between the Nicaragua and the Platforms judgments. In the Nicaragua judgment, the American breaches of the very general references to peace and friendship86 included in the preamble appear, even though they are referred to together with other rules, to be capable of founding the Court’s jurisdiction. This position led Iran, in an initial version of its pleadings, to plead breach of the « spirit and purpose » of the friendship treaty binding it to the United States87 , a plea that was subsequently withdrawn by the applicant88 . Indeed, the Court is now much less willing to take into consideration general undertakings of this nature. Whereas in 1984 it had accepted only the fact, set out in the preamble, that the States were « desirous of strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship which have traditionally united the two countries », it now denies any normative scope to Article 1er of the treaty with Iran, which nevertheless provides that « there shall be a stable, lasting and sincere peace » between the parties. In fact, it is not so much the normative value of this article that is denied as its autonomy89 . However, even if the Court cannot « lose sight » of it90 , the article in question only sets an objective to be achieved, an objective through which the other provisions must be interpreted91 . There can therefore be no dispute between the parties, nor, by the same token, any jurisdiction for the Court92 .
The fictitious nature of the link -. The fictitious nature hypothesis largely overlaps with the non-existence hypothesis. But whereas non-existence was characterised by the absence of facts falling within the scope of the instruments relied on, fictitiousness results from the inadequacy of the facts in dispute to the characterisation that the claimant applies to them. Although this character is ultimately reduced to the absence of a dispute, it deserves particular attention. The manoeuvring involved reveals the difficulties encountered by the plaintiffs in taking legal action, and the means used to circumvent them.
This is the case in Legality of Use of Force. In this case, the FRY brought before the Court a complaint relating to the air strikes to which it was subjected by the members of NATO, but essentially based the jurisdiction of the Court on the Genocide Convention93 . The defendants disputed the relevance of the Convention94 . They were followed on this point by the judges, who found â as no one could seriously doubt â « that the use of force in itself cannot constitute an act of genocide »95 . In fact, the intentional element characteristic of the crime of genocide was lacking96 . As the facts before it were not likely to be characterised as genocide, the Court refused, upon its prima facie assessment, to recognise its jurisdiction on the basis of the 1948 Convention97 . But it was only after deconstructing the applicant’s arguments that the Court was able to take such a decision. According to the applicant, war subjects a national group, contrary to Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention, « to conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction »98 . More specifically, environmental damage and the use of weapons that cause long-term damage, such as depleted uranium99 , are considered to be sources of conditions leading to the physical destruction of the group. The destruction of infrastructure, particularly electrical infrastructure, was « implicit evidence of the intention to destroy totally or partially the Yugoslav national group as such »100 . However, the outrageous nature of the characterisation gives rise to suspicions that the FRY was offering the Court more than an argument: implicitly, the high court was being asked to « act as if » the facts were what the applicant said they were, on the basis of the fundamental nature of the interests to be protected. The Court refused to accept the fiction.
The fictitious nature of the link is still partly the reason why the Court rejected the DRC’s application against Rwanda. In the face of the plethora of instruments invoked by the Applicant, it should be noted first and foremost that the Respondent did very little to counter the fictitious nature argument. Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, the defence limited its argument to the very classic â but also very convincing â questions of the enforceability of instruments101 . The fictitiousness argument comes into play again when the enforceability of the agreement in question cannot be challenged beyond doubt. Rwanda, which is undoubtedly bound by the Vienna Convention, argues that there is no link between the dispute submitted to the Court and the subject-matter of article 66 of that Convention102 . Giving back to the article in question its true meaning and to the concept its true scope, the judges had, at the provisional stage, noted the absence of any dispute « concerning a conflict between a treaty and a peremptory norm of international law »103 . Following the elucidation of an identical manoeuvre, the Court also dismissed the Unesco Convention: the arbitration clause contained in this instrument concerned only the interpretation of the Convention, whereas the Congolese application was essentially aimed at sanctioning a failure to apply it. As the Court concluded, such an application « does not therefore appear to fall within the scope of the said article »104 .
The following qualification is based on a completely different kind of fiction. While the claimant’s strategy sometimes tends to amplify the facts, to exaggerate them in order to make them assume a qualification that they do not achieve, the approaches common to Nicaragua and Iran proceed from the opposite reasoning. Rather than exaggerating the facts, the aim this time is to reduce them to proportions that bear no relation to their initial seriousness. In their arguments concerning the breach of friendship treaties, the claimants complain that the United States, through its military actions, failed to fulfil its obligation to treat the nationals, property and undertakings of the opposing party fairly and equitably. In its statement of claim, Nicaragua points out that :
« Armed attacks against Nicaragua by air, land and sea, resulting in the loss of human lives, severe human suffering and material damages cannot be seen as ‘equitable treatment to the persons, enterprises and other interests’ of Nicaraguan nationals »105 .
The argument is so incontrovertible that it becomes suspect, and if the garb of genocide is too large for the use of force, the garb of breach of a general obligation enshrined in a treaty with a commercial purpose is far too narrow. Bypassing the apparent obviousness of the proposition, the Court restores the scope of the norm invoked and the proportions and nature of the facts. It resituates the discourse in a broader field than the artificially reduced one in which the plaintiff intended to hold it. This form of fiction blends in this time with the partial nature of the applications before the Court.
B â Admitting fragmentary qualifications
For States subject to the use of force, obtaining a decision from the Court is a necessity. Faced with this imperative, it is of little importance to States that only part of the facts are subsumed under the established characterisation. Entering through a small back door, however, means leaving a quantitatively and qualitatively significant part of the grievances outside the courtroom. This initial approach alters the entire debate.
The partial nature of the link. The procedural framework leaves neither the Court nor the applicant much room for manoeuvre. The dilemma of jurisdiction then arises in terms of little or nothing. Some judgments, based on pleas that are particularly anecdotal in relation to the reality of the facts, nevertheless pose serious problems of judicial policy. They also raise the question of whether an all-or-nothing policy might not be more satisfactory for all concerned. When the Court is seized of a sometimes minute part of a whole on which it cannot focus, it runs the risk of handing down decisions that are difficult to understand. While the risk of its decisions not being applied should not influence its action106 , it should undoubtedly have regard to their applicability.
The partial nature of the dispute submitted to the Court can take two forms, as illustrated by the defence presented by Honduras. Citing the general nature of the conflict in Central America, the State emphasised the artificial aspect of the division, both material and personal, that Nicaragua was attempting to bring about107 . Even more problematic than the personal division â which can already give rise to inextricable operational difficulties in implementing the decision â is the material division. Thus, in the case between the United States and Nicaragua, the seriousness of the facts underlying the application was reduced to minor breaches of the Treaty of Friendship, such as the prohibition on impeding maritime traffic, the prohibition on imposing obstacles to the import of goods from the other party, the prohibition on preventing the other party from transiting through its territory, or the prohibition on granting fair treatment to Nicaraguan persons, property and interests108 . In the Platforms case, the entire judicial debate focused on a simple effect on trade, as envisaged by Article X § 1 of the Treaty.
The Court’s position on this segmentation of disputes is set out in the Hostages case109 , and repeated in particular in the Nicaragua case: « nothing in the Statute or the Rules prevents [the Court] from taking up one aspect of a dispute for the sole reason that the dispute involves other aspects, however important they may be »110 . From a technical point of view, the argument is not necessarily open to criticism. The fact that there is a cluster of legal disputes between the parties should not prevent them from being resolved independently of each other, provided that they are sufficiently distinct. Similarly, it is strictly the right of a party to bring a dispute before the Court, even if it is only one of several. Such a division becomes problematic, however, when it leads to an indissociable whole being broken down into a sum of parts artificially abstracted from their context. An unjustified synecdoche then alters the reasoning111 .
The bogus nature of the dispute -. When the Court accepts that it is seised of an incidental matter that has nothing to do with the main issue, it opens the way to bogus applications based on minor disputes. The dispute before the court is then :
« It is understandable, therefore, that the support found in a treaty of commerce and navigation for a decision on questions of international peace and security should give rise to some unease. In this respect, it is understandable that the support found in a treaty of commerce and navigation for the determination of questions affecting international peace and security should give rise to some unease »112 .
Since the Nicaragua affair, which gave rise to these remarks, the unease has persisted.
The facticity argument is used by many defendants in their submissions. The United States, for example, will invoke it against Nicaragua â which is accused of concealing behind various requests a single demand relating to the use of force113 â and Iran â whose request is summed up by the defendant as a desire to sanction it for its support for Iraq114 . The same argument of « artificiality » was used by Honduras against Nicaragua, the object of the application being to exert « political pressure » on neighbouring States115 . However, the Court took the view that it was not for it to « consider the political motivations which may lead a State, at a given moment or in given circumstances, to choose a judicial settlement »116 . Complaints officially lodged with the Court, if they are genuine, attest to the existence of a dispute falling within the scope of the Convention invoked as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. It matters little, then, that they are of only very secondary interest to the claimant, and that recourse to international justice is essentially instrumental.
Thus, only the non-existence or fictitious nature of the link from which the applicant claims to infer the Court’s jurisdiction constitutes an obstacle to that jurisdiction. The partial nature of the applications, which leads to their fictitious nature, does not lead the Court to decline jurisdiction. However, by confining itself to appearances, the Court adopts an excessively formalistic approach, which is therefore unconvincing. Fiction is characterised by a desire to make people believe in something that is not, and facticity arises from a counterfeit use of something that is. As the Court’s case law stands, it is not certain that the difference is very marked.
III â The international judge and war
The consensualism required for access to the international courts, combined with the absence of arbitration clauses in conventions relating to the law of war, gives rise to a singular shift in the judicial debate117 . The effects of this shift in the Court’s judgments on the merits could be the subject of an in-depth analysis. However, to remain within the scope of this study, it is appropriate to confine ourselves to a few provisional observations. We can point to the Court’s tendency to extract the phenomena of violence from their material reality, sometimes under the pressure of procedural imperatives. The shortcomings of this tendency raise the question of whether the old argument that the institution is unsuited to resolving situations of active hostilities is entirely unfounded. Is it possible, as the high court claims, to lose interest in armed conflict as such and see it merely as a ‘situation’ requiring a peaceful resolution of the legal issues involved118 ? Is it not somewhat illusory to claim to understand a war dispute as a stable set of rights and obligations to be distributed, and somewhat illogical to claim to settle peacefully a dispute in which a war is taking place? Such an approach has two consequences: on the one hand, the discourse it produces on armed conflict can only be truncated; on the other hand, the repeated desire to treat war as a dispute that does not escape ordinary law raises serious problems of legal technique.
A truncated judicial discourse. The Court, accepting jurisdiction based on instruments that cover only part of the conflict between the parties, will confine itself strictly to the limits imposed by those instruments. It is therefore impossible, as it will remind Bosnia-Herzegovina119 , to broaden the debate once jurisdiction has been established. The norms of the law of war, which govern the situation, do not offer any support to the applicant’s claims. The shortcomings of the jurisdiction phase are transferred to the debates on the merits. The Court’s decision will concern, and will concern only, breaches of conventions containing an applicable arbitration clause. While the material situation is indisputably of a warlike nature, no rule of the law of war will underlie the solution provided. In these conditions, the referral to the Court has at best no effect on the reality of the situation and the discourse produced is inevitably truncated by the illicit and essential reparations. The intention is undoubtedly laudable, but this « disaggregation » of the armed conflict into several conflicting units that can be resolved independently of each other ignores the organic unity of this type of situation. By avoiding the context, the Court spares itself the tragic considerations that still characterise inter-State relations. Its judgments can therefore justifiably give the image of an international society marching apace towards a civilisation of morals. However, this optimistic picture contrasts radically with the one painted by the case law of the international criminal tribunals. These courts, which never fail to reiterate the phenomena of mass violence, lead us to quite different conclusions. In fact, the juxtaposition of the two legal practices leads us to surreptitiously draw up a picture of a pacified order based on international law, which is only accidentally disturbed by individual acts of violence.
In any case, it is clear that there is a paradox in keeping the International Court of Justice at a distance from the implementation of the law of war, while at the same time increasing the jurisdiction of this issue at the individual level. This contradiction stems from a blurring of the legal discourse which, by shifting responsibility for mass crimes onto individuals alone, tends to obscure their eminently collective nature.
The standards invoked and the war situation -. The second consequence of this practice is that standards are applied to situations that they are certainly not intended to govern. In its order concerning the situation in Georgia, the Court conceded that the breaches of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination invoked « could be covered by other rules of international law, in particular humanitarian law »120 . The question raised is, once again, that of the place of human rights in the event of armed conflict. Here we come up against the limits of the theory of humanitarian law as a lex specialis, a theory into which the Court has sought since 1996 to confine the law of war121 . According to the Court’s case law, the norms of the law of peace continue to apply in time of war, and it is only as a special law that humanitarian law applies122 . Apart from the problem of expediency that the question immediately raises, its implementation poses serious difficulties precisely when a conflict arises between a general norm, applicable at all times, and another that is special to wartime. The Georgian case is symptomatic in this respect: the discrimination prohibited by the 1965 Convention is to a large extent mirrored in humanitarian law. Common Article 3 and Articles 13 and 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit unfavourable discrimination based on « race, colour, religion or belief, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria »123 . In the system established by the Court, the general law constituted by the 1965 Convention should logically take a back seat to the applicable rules of humanitarian law, and Russia would therefore only be liable for breaching the latter. The difficulty lies in the fact that the 1965 Convention provides for the Court’s jurisdiction in its application, whereas the rule of humanitarian law does not. What, then, is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case? Short of accepting, at the risk of logic and law, the transposition of the procedural obligation relating to one norm to all other norms of similar content, it is impossible to find any acceptance by Russia of the Court’s jurisdiction to apply jus in bello measures. The way out, then, may be to remain within the scope of the law of peace, denying the applicability of humanitarian law to the situation, and therefore the existence of an armed conflict124 . Herein lies the difficulty of the system that the Court is attempting to develop: an equation with multiple variables, the solution in practice becomes unpredictable. The humanist weight that the Court may still be tempted to apply will certainly not compensate for the uncertainty. At the preliminary objections stage, the Court was able to accept its prima facie jurisdiction by avoiding tackling the issue head-on. It will certainly be more difficult to omit it during the judgment on the merits.
Notes
1 These referrals relate to seven distinct contexts of the use of weapons, in the context of international as well as internal or even mixed conflicts. They may have concerned â alternatively or cumulatively â jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Some situations have given rise to several applications. NATO’s strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999 gave rise to ten cases, each brought against a different member of the Organisation. Similarly, the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo was the source of four applications (against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, the latter being renewed in 2002). The conflict in Central America generated three (against the United States, Costa Rica and Honduras), while the conflict linked to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s led to two â from Bosnia-Herzegovina and then Croatia â against the FRY. The Georgian conflict in the summer of 2008, the Iranian oil rigs affair and the Indo-Pakistani dispute are the other occurrences of this type of dispute. The Corfu Channel case was excluded from the list, as it was from the rest of the analysis: it is too different from other disputes to be usefully placed on the same level. For a systematic study of cases involving the use of force, see. Georges Labrecque, La force et le droit, jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice, QuĂ©bec, Ă©ditions Yvon Blais, Bruylant, 646 p.
2 A. DecenciÚre-FerrandiÚre, « Quelques réflexions touchant le rÚglement des conflits internationaux », RGDIP, 1929, pp. 416-451.
3 I.C.J., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, [1984] ECR 435, § 96.
4 J. Verhoeven, « Le droit, le juge et la violence. Les arrĂȘts Nicaragua c. Ătats-Unis », RGDIP, 1987, pp. 1159-1239;
A. Pellet, « Le glaive et la balance », in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity â Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 539-566.
5 On the concept of « seisin » in international law and its regime, see M. Forteau, « La saisine des juridictions internationales vocation universelle », in H. Ruiz Fabri and J.M. Sorel, La saisine des juridictions internationales, Paris, Pedone, 2005, pp. M. Forteau, « La saisine des juridictions internationales à vocation universelle », in H. Ruiz Fabri and J.M. Sorel, La saisine des juridictions internationales, Paris, Pedone, 2005, pp. 9-87.
6 I.C.J., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, Reports 1999, pp. 131-132, §§ 16-19.
7 Idem, p. 132, § 20.
8 The basis for the ad hoc agreement referred to in Rule 38 § 5 of the Rules of Court has been incorporated into many applications concerning acts of war. However, the correlative agreement of the respondent has never been obtained.
9 The Court confirmed the absence in the jus in bello of any clause capable of founding its jurisdiction in the case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, § 39, p. 620. With regard to jus ad bellum, it is significant to note that the United Nations Charter itself is devoid of any clause of this type.
10 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 December 1965 (resolution 2106 (XX)) and opened for signature on 7 March 1966.
11 Application instituting proceedings of 12 August 2008 lodged by the Republic of Georgia against the Russian Federation, p. 29, § 82 (Where the documents or pleadings cited have not yet been published in the pleadings and documents series, references are made to the digital versions available on the Court’s website [http://www.icj-cij.org]).
12 I.C.J., Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russia), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, § 112 (unreported).
13 Dissenting opinion to the order of 15 October 2008, § 3. Another argument in the dissenting opinion relates to the lack of regard for the procedural conditions of the arbitration clause invoked: the Court’s case-law on the obligation and the possibility for the parties to negotiate in a situation of conflict has been the subject of different assessments : the Court thus considered in the Nicaragua case that the circumstances of the case rendered the diplomatic precondition required by the 1956 Treaty illusory (Military and Paramilitary Activities, Preliminary Objections, op. cit, § 83). It will, however, require the DRC to prove that it has done so (I.C.J., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, Reports 2002, p. 247, § 79).
14 The very title of the case (Proceedings brought by Georgia) seems to reveal the difficulty of determining the real subject-matter of the application. On the title of cases before the Court, see M. Kamto, « L’intitulĂ© d’une affaire portĂ©e devant la C.I.R. ». M. Kamto, « L’intitulĂ© d’une affaire portĂ©e devant la C.I.J. », RBDI, 2001-1, pp. 5-22.
15 Application lodged by Georgia, op. cit. p. 30, point (a).
16 Idem, p. 30, point f).
17 Ibid, p. 30, point h).
18 Argument by Alain Pellet, Minutes of the hearing of 8 September 2008 at 3 p.m. (CR 2008/23), p. 30, § 12.
19 A peace agreement was signed in Simla on 3 July 1972, and the Security Council took note of the end of hostilities in its resolution 307 (1971) as soon as the ceasefire was concluded.
20 Application instituting proceedings of 11 May 1973, filed by Pakistan against India, I.C.J. Pleadings, Trial of Pakistani prisoners of war, p. 6.
21 It is true that « [t]he disputes brought before the Court, which thereby become disputes subject to its jurisdiction, are only very rarely identical to the dispute actually existing between two States » (E. Jouannet, « Le juge international face aux problĂšmes d’incohĂ©rence et d’instabilitĂ© du droit international. Quelques rĂ©flexions Ă propos de l’arrĂȘt CIJ du 6 novembre 2003, Affaire des Plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres », RGDIP, 2004-4, p. 927). However, the inescapable distortion that the judicial prism generates by its very nature tends, in certain cases, to become a deliberate tool for abusing the judge’s jurisdiction.
22 Art. XXXI of the American Treaty of Peaceful Settlement (Pact of BogotĂĄ), signed on 30 April 1948 in BogotĂĄ, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 30, p. 84.
23 Application instituting proceedings submitted by the Government of Nicaragua on 25 July 1986, I.C.J. Pleadings, Case concerning Frontier and Transboundary Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), p. 3.
24 Application instituting proceedings submitted by the Government of Nicaragua on 25 July 1986, I.C.J. Pleadings, Case concerning Frontier and Transboundary Actions (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), p. 3.
25 Supplement of 12 May 1999 to the application lodged by the FRY against the Kingdom of Belgium (unpublished) and Supplement of 12 May 1999 to the application lodged by the FRY against the Kingdom of the Netherlands (unpublished). The Court’s jurisdiction was envisaged by these Conventions as covering, respectively, « all disputes in respect of which the parties are mutually disputing a right » (Art. 4 of the Convention on Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration, signed at Belgrade on 25 March 1930 between Yugoslavia and Belgium, League of Nations Treaty Series, 1930, Vol. 106, p. 343, no. 2455) and on « all disputes of whatever nature relating to a right alleged by one of the High Contracting Parties and contested by the other » (Art. 2 of the Treaty on Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation, signed at The Hague on 11 March 1931 between Yugoslavia and the Netherlands, Recueil des TraitĂ©s de la SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations, 1932, Vol. 129, p. 90, no. 2952).
26 Memorial of Nicaragua (questions of jurisdiction and admissibility), I.C.J. Memorials, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Vol. I, p. 403. This basis of jurisdiction had not been mentioned in the application instituting the proceedings.
27 Application instituting proceedings of 2 November 1992, presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States of America, pp. 5-6 (unpublished).
28 Application by Pakistan against India, op. cit. p. 7, § 11.
29 Application instituting proceedings of 20 March 1993, lodged by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the FRY, p. 1 (unpublished).
30 See for example: Application instituting proceedings of 29 April 1999, lodged by the FRY against the Kingdom of Belgium, p. 4 (unpublished).
31 Application instituting proceedings of 2 July 1999, lodged by the Republic of Croatia against the FRY, p. 2 (not published).
32 With the exception of the application against Uganda, that State having accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36 § 2 of the Statute, making it unnecessary to establish the Court’s jurisdiction by means of an arbitration clause.
33 On the Congolese applicant’s strategy, and desperation, with regard to establishing the Court’s jurisdiction, see. F. Latty, « La Cour internationale de justice face aux tiraillements du droit international : les arrĂȘts dans les affaires des activitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (RDC c. Ouganda, 19 dĂ©cembre 2005 ; RDC c Rwanda, 3 fĂ©vrier 2006) », AFDI, 2005, pp. 209 et seq. For a detailed study of the various arbitration clauses invoked and their rejection by the Court, see. F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans l’affaire des ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo (Nouvelle requĂȘte: 2002) (RĂ©publique dĂ©mocratique du Congo c. Rwanda) », AFDI, 2007, pp. 328-346.
34 See, for example, the application instituting proceedings of 23 June 1999, lodged by the DRC against the Republic of Burundi, pp. 8-9 (unreported). The grounds are identical in the application lodged on the same date against the Republic of Rwanda (unpublished).
35 Application instituting proceedings of 28 May 2002, lodged by the DRC against the Republic of Rwanda (second application), p. 18 (unpublished).
36 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002), Provisional Measures, op. cit. p. 242, § 62.
37 Application by the DRC (DRC v. Rwanda, second application, 2002), op. cit. pp. 28 et seq.
38 These include the two 1966 Covenants, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2002 Protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. The applicant also invokes international custom and the « general basic principles of humanitarian law » identified by the Court in the Nicaragua case. Lastly, in a final series, the DRC refers in particular to the 1948 Universal Declaration, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 protocols.
39 ICJ, East Timor, judgment of 30 June 1995, Reports 1995, p. 102, § 29. On this aspect of the judgment, and in particular on the transposition of the erga omnes norms solution to jus cogens norms, see. F. Latty, « La Cour internationale de justice face aux tiraillements du droit international », op. cit. pp. 209-211.
40 For a commentary on this article: H. Ruiz Fabri, « Commentaire de l’article 66 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traitĂ©s », in O. Corten, P. Klein (eds), Commentaire des Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traitĂ©s, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, T. 3, pp. 2390-2427, and in particular pp. 2410-2414.
41 On this point, see. Y. Kerbrat, « De quelques aspects des procĂ©dures incidentes devant la Cour internationale de justice: Les ordonnances des 29 novembre 2001 et 10 juillet 2002 dans les affaires des activitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du Congo« , AFDI, 2002, p. 356; F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans l’affaire des ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du CongoâŠÂ«Â , op. cit. p. 336.
42 Some legal scholars have already deplored the fact that certain international legal actors have fallen « under the spell » of this concept (M. J. Glennon, « De l’absurditĂ© du droit impĂ©ratif (jus cogens) », RGDIP, 2006-3, p. 530), to the detriment of its nature and scope (for an illustration, see F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans affaire ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur territoire du CongoâŠÂ », op. cit. F. Dopagne, « Les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans l’affaire des ActivitĂ©s armĂ©es sur le territoire du CongoâŠÂ«Â , op. cit. p. 336).
43 On this point,see infra, Part II, a.
44 Application by the FRY against Belgium, op. cit. p. 5.
45 The only exceptions concern cases that were quickly struck off the list (Congo v. Rwanda (first application); Congo v. Burundi; Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), or where the use of armed force ceased definitively before proceedings were instituted (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America; Croatia v. FRY). Burundi; Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), or where the use of armed force ceased definitively before the proceedings were instituted (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America; Croatia v. FRY).
46 Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Nicaragua (9 April 1984, I.C.J. Pleadings, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Vol. I, p. 29, § 10.
47 Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the DRC (DRC v. Uganda) on 19 June 2000, p. 3, points (1) to (3) (unreported).
48 For an analysis of the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction at the provisional measures stage, see L. Boisson de Chazournes, « Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans l’affaire relative Ă l’application de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression de crime de gĂ©nocide ». L. Boisson de Chazournes, « Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans l’affaire relative Ă l’application de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide », AFDI, 1993, pp. 516-525.
49 Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Bosniaand Herzegovina on 20 March 1993, pp. 5-6, § 14, paragraphs (2) to (6) (unreported). On the basis of Article 2, the Court is asked to enjoin the FRY to refrain from any support for the Bosnian Serb forces and to refrain itself from the use or threat of use of force. Under Article 51, Bosnia and Herzegovina is seeking recognition by the Court of its right of individual and collective self-defence, a recognition which, under the terms of the application, includes the lifting of the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council (this last point being not without its difficulties as regards the arrangement of the respective competences of the Court and the Security Council, see note 77).
50 Idem, p. 5, § 14, point 1). This application requires the FRY to cease all acts falling within the scope of the Convention. In practice, however, the subject-matter of that application is very similar to applications based on the law of war. The cessation sought under the Convention cannot be aimed at a single, unreal suspension of genocidal intent. It is therefore still the material acts of belligerence that are targeted. However, the genocidal nature of these acts allows them to be included without contradiction in the scope of the instrument founding the Court’s jurisdiction.
51 On the Court’s orders, see. L. Boisson de Chazournes, « La Cour internationale de justice aux prises avec la crise du Kosovo : Ă propos de la demande en mesures conservatoires de la RĂ©publique fĂ©dĂ©rale de Yougoslavie », AFDI, 1999, pp. 453-471, and in particular pp. 456-459.
52 The application, based on Article 2 § 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, was acceptable only to those States that had subscribed to the compulsory jurisdiction clause in Article 36 § 2 of the Statute. It would have become acceptable to other States only in the unlikely event that they accepted the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of Rule 38(5) of the Rules of Court. It is regrettable that the FRY has, perhaps deliberately, confused the various grounds for its applications. This confusion leads to a strange, albeit opportune, form of cross-referencing between the bases of ancillary jurisdiction (Article 38 § 5) and the main applications (jus ad bellum / jus in bello). This phenomenon is exacerbated by the indistinctness of applications against different NATO members, despite the fact that the fabric of their treaties is often very different.
53 Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) on 29 April 1999, p. 14 (unreported).
54 Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the DRC (DRC v. Rwanda, second application) on 28 May 2002, p. 26 (unreported).
55 Idem, p. 26.
56 Ibid, pp. 26-31.
57 Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Georgia against Russia on 14 August 2008 (not published).
58 Idem, p. 9, § 17, point b).
59 Drawing a parallel with the Serbian precedent in the lawfulness of the use of force case, the dissenting opinion appended to the Court’s order of 15 October 2008 noted that « Russia’s armed actions after 8 August cannot in themselves constitute acts of racial discrimination » (op. cit., §§ 8-9).
60 Ibid, p. 9, § 17, point c). The wording will be changed in the second version of the application, submitted on 22 August 2008, p. 9, § 23, points a) and b).
61 As might be suggested, for example, by the FRY’s virtual lack of interest at the preliminary objections stage (even if many factors explain its « total lack of litigious spirit », see O. de Frouville, « Une harmonie dissonante de la justice internationale: les arrĂȘt de la Cour internationale de justice sur les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans l’affaire relative la LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de force », in O. de Frouville, « Une harmonie dissonante de la justice internationale: les arrĂȘts de la Cour internationale de justice sur les exceptions prĂ©liminaires dans l’affaire relative Ă la LicĂ©itĂ© de lâemploi de la force« , AFDI, 2004, p. 344).
62 Application initiating proceedings (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), op. cit., p. 6, §§ 14-22; Application initiating proceedings (Nicaragua v. Honduras), op. cit., p. 6, §§ 21-29.
63 Application by Bosnia and Herzegovina, op. cit., § 135 (a).
64 This request was subsequently amended, deleting all requests not directly related to the Genocide Convention.
65 Application of Bosnia-Herzegovina, op. cit., pt. 135 (b).
66 Idem, pt. 135 c).
67 Ibid, pt. 135 d), g), h) and i).
68 Ibid, pt. 135 e), f), j) to o).
69 Application lodged by the FRY against Belgium, op. cit. p. 4, points (1) and (2).
70 Idem, points 3) to 7).
71 Ibid, point 8).
72 See, for example, the application lodged by the DRC against Burundi, op. cit. p. 14. The complaints against Rwanda and Uganda are similar. In the latter case, it should be noted that the use of these instruments does not call for any criticism, as the Court’s jurisdiction is based on Article 36 § 2 of the Statute. It is only regrettable once again that the applicants are treating in a similar way cases which, although related in fact, are in law part of very different relationships (see note 52).
73 Idem.
74 See to this effect the preliminary objections submitted by the FRY on 1er September 2002, pp. 53-57 (unpublished). In its judgment of 18 November 2008, the Court confined the question of its jurisdiction to the question whether the Genocide Convention could be relied on against the Respondent. As the FRY had not challenged whether the facts at issue fell within the scope of the Convention, the Court did not rule on that point. On the more specific question of whether the communication of information on the missing or the restitution of cultural objects were remedies falling within the scope of the Genocide Convention, the Court considered that the remedies to be provided depended on the conclusions it reached in the judgment on the merits. The content of those requests was therefore « not such as to be the subject of a preliminary objection » (I.C.J., Case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, judgment of 18 November 2008, pp. 47-48, §§ 139 and 143 (unreported)).
75 Military and Paramilitary Activities⊠(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, op. cit. p. 437, § 100.
76 The military inferiority of the claimants almost invariably figures prominently among these reasons. It should also be noted that the advent of a peace agreement between the parties does not appear to put an end to an action brought before the Court. For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not withdraw its application after the conclusion of the Dayton Accords in 1995 (on this aspect, see. S. Maljean-Dubois, « L’affaire relative Ă l’application de la Convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide (Bosnie-HerzĂ©govine c. Ygoslavie), arrĂȘt du 11 juillet 1996, exceptions prĂ©liminaires », AFDI, 1996, p. 358). Even in this case, the Court therefore remains an additional means for the protagonists to obtain compensation that they have not succeeded in having written into the diplomatic regulations.
77 It should be noted that, for a large proportion of the cases studied, recourse to the United Nations judicial body is a counterpoint to a failure to obtain the support of the Security Council, whatever the reasons for that failure. From the point of view of principle, the Court has had occasion to state that the simultaneous intervention of the Security Council in a dispute is not an obstacle to the admissibility of the application (Military and Paramilitary Activities⊠(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, op. cit., pp. 433-436, §§ 92-98). On the one hand, the Court rejected the argument of the exclusivity of the Council’s intervention in that it « tends to transpose to the international level domestic notions of the separation of powers, whereas these notions do not apply to relations between international institutions » (idem, p. 433 § 92). On the other hand, it affirmed that the action of the two institutions stemmed from « distinct but complementary functions » (ibid., p. 435, § 95), thus validating the idea of a « functional parallelism » (A. Pellet, « Le glaive et la balance », op. cit., p. 550). However, from the point of view of its modalities, this solution is not without raising certain difficulties as to the articulation of the missions of the two institutions, and the authority of their respective decisions. The American respondent feared, but the judges did not follow, that the Court would be set up as a body to « appeal » decisions of the Security Council (Military and Paramilitary Activities⊠(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, op. cit., p. 436, § 98). The case between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY provides a topical illustration of this appeal hypothesis (see footnote 49). In practice, it was only by taking numerous precautions that the Court succeeded in preventing its judgments from coming into conflict with the Council’s decisions (on these various aspects, see. A. Pellet, « Le glaive et la balance », op. cit, pp. 545-550; L. Boisson de Chazournes, « Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans l’affaire relative Ă l’application de la convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocide », op. cit, pp. 534-536). More broadly, on the conflicts between collective security and international responsibility, see Mathias Forteau, Droit de la sĂ©curitĂ© collective et de la responsabilitĂ© internationale, op. cit. Mathias Forteau, Droit de la sĂ©curitĂ© collective et droit de la responsabilitĂ© internationale, Paris, Pedone, 2006, 699 p.
78 Only seven situations contain lessons about the way in which the Court received the States’ applications. Five were successful for the applicants. The applications by the FRY against the members of NATO and by the DRC against Rwanda are the only examples of lack of jurisdiction. As regards the other cases, four were struck out of the list of cases before any decision was taken on jurisdiction, and two have not yet been the subject of a final decision by the Court (on the judgment of 18 November 2008, see note 74).
79 Military and paramilitary activitiesâŠ, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit. p. 427, § 81.
80 Memorial submitted by Rwanda (DRC v. Rwanda (first application)) on 21 April 2000, p. 10, § 2.12 (unpublished).
81 Military and paramilitary activitiesâŠ, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit, p. 428, § 83.
82 I.C.J., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1996] ECR 614, § 27. For an analysis of this case and in particular of the existence of a link between the dispute raised and the arbitration clause invoked: S. Maljean-Dubois, « L’affaire relative Ă l’application de la Convention pour la prĂ©vention et la rĂ©pression du crime de gĂ©nocideâŠÂ », op. cit. at pp. 373-375.
83 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, op. cit. p. 617, § 35.
84 Idem, pp. 619-620, § 38. The Court based its reasoning on an argument combining the territorial scope of the 1919 Treaty and the law of succession to international treaties. The Minorities Treaty concerned only the protection of minorities on the territory of the signatory State. As a result of inheritance law, the FRY would only be bound to respect the clauses of this treaty for the portion of territory that it now owns, and not for the Yugoslav territory of the time. As Bosnia and Herzegovina had not invoked any failure to protect minorities located in the FRY, the Court could not establish a link between the alleged facts and the treaty.
85 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002), Provisional Measures, op. cit. p. 247, § 79.
86 Military and paramilitary activitiesâŠ, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit, p. 428, § 83.
87 Application by the Islamic Republic of Iran, op. cit. p. 5. The allegation of violation of the object and purpose was qualified later in the proceedings, with Iran finally limiting its application to the violation of precisely identified articles of the treaty.
88 I.C.J., Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1996] ECR 809, § 15.
89 Idem, p. 815, § 31.
90 Ibid, p. 820, § 52.
91 Ibid, p. 813, § 28.
92 For an analysis of this judgment, and of the logical contortions the Court had to resort to in order to deal with the « use of force » aspect of a dispute based on an essentially commercial treaty, see P. d’Argent, « Du commerce Ă lâemploi de la force: l’affaire des plates-formes pĂ©troĂšres (arrĂȘt sur fond) », AFDI. P. d’Argent, « Du commerce Ă lâemploi de la force: l’affaire des plates-formes pĂ©troliĂšres (arrĂȘt sur le fond) », AFDI, 2003, pp. 266-289, and in particular pp. 270-275. See also E. Jouannet, « Le juge international face aux problĂšmes d’incohĂ©rence et d’instabilitĂ© du droit internationalâŠÂ », op. cit, p. 927.
93 In some of the applications, the basis of the Genocide Convention was supplemented by specific conventions or by invoking acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 36 § 2 of the Statute, without any further success for the applicant (on this aspect, see note 52).
94 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, op. cit. p. 136, § 35. From this point of view, the cases of the United States and Spain should be isolated, as the Court was led to consider itself manifestly incompetent because of the existence of reservations to the arbitration clause in that Convention. These reservations, the compatibility of which with the Convention was not challenged, led the Court to strike the cases out of its list of cases (see I.C.J., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, Reports 1999, p. 924, § 25, and I.C.J., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, Reports 1999, p. 771, § 25).
95 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, op. cit. p. 138, § 40.
96 Idem, p. 138, § 40.
97 Ibid, p. 138, § 41.
98 Ibid, p. 136, § 35.
99 Ibid, p. 136, §§ 34-35.
100 Ibid, p. 136, § 35.
101 Memorial relating to the jurisdiction of the Court submitted by Rwanda (DRC v. Rwanda (second application)) on 20 January 2003, pp. 10 et seq. The inopposability of the instruments invoked by the DRC could result either from reservations precluding the Court’s jurisdiction (in the case of the Racial Discrimination Convention, Memorial, p. 11), or simply from the respondent’s total lack of participation in the Convention (in the case of the Torture and Genocide Conventions, Memorial, pp. 10 and 13). Other Conventions are rejected on the grounds that they do not comply with the conditions and procedures for referral to the Court (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Unesco Convention, WHO Convention, brief, pp. 16 et seq.); on this last aspect, see note 13.
102 Idem, p. 35, § 3.76.
103 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002), Provisional Measures, op. cit. p. 246, § 73.
104 Idem, p. 248, § 83.
105 Nicaragua’s Memorial (questions of jurisdiction and admissibility), op. cit., p. 405, § 174.
106 P.C.I.J., ChorzĂłw Factory, Series A, no. 17, p. 63.
107 I.C.J., Cross-Border Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, [1988] ECR 91, § 53.
108 Military and paramilitary activitiesâŠ, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit, p. 428, § 82.
109 I.C.J., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Reports 1981, p. 19, § 36.
110 Military and paramilitary activitiesâŠ, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit, p. 439, § 105.
111 The consequences of this alteration were highlighted in the Security Council during the debates on the judgment of 27 June 1986. Nicaragua had asked the Security Council to examine the dispute between it and the United States « which had been the subject of a judgment of the Court » (letter of 22 July 1986, S/18230). The British representative was careful to distinguish between the general dispute between the two States and the more limited dispute decided by the Court. He emphasised that Nicaragua’s letter went beyond the operative part of the judgment and concerned the dispute as a whole. He added that « the International Court of Justice has not had to deal with the details of the whole Central American problem » and that « it was inappropriate to attempt to select for separate consideration a very small part of the overall problem, as was attempted to be done in Nicaragua’s letter [âŠ] » (Minutes of the 2704Ăšme meeting, S/PV.2704, pp. 47-48).
112 J. Verhoeven, op. cit. pp. 1181-1182.
113 Military and paramilitary activitiesâŠ, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit, p. 431, § 89.
114 Preliminary objections presented by the United States on 16 December 1993, p. 2, § 5-6 (unpublished).
115 Cross-Border Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, op. cit. p. 91, § 51. On the reasons for the referral, see M. Forteau, « La saisine des juridictions internationales⊠M. Forteau, « La saisine des juridictions internationalesâŠÂ », op. cit. p. 34.
116 Idem, p. 91, § 52.
117 When it does not lead the Court to deliberately exceed its jurisdiction. Academic writers have noted that the Court is « circumventing the obstacle of its lack of jurisdiction » (Y. Kerbrat, « De quelques aspects des procĂ©dures incidentes devant la Cour internationale de JusticeâŠÂ », op. cit., pp. 358 et seq.) by means of obiter dicta constituting veritable « sentences en passant » (idem). This trend had already been highlighted in relation to the provisional measures requested by the FRY in 1999, see L. Boisson de Chazournot, op. cit. L. Boisson de Chazournes, « La Cour internationale de justice aux prises avec la crise du Kosovo », op. cit. pp. 463-465. For an analysis of this use of reasons by the Court: G. Cahin, « La motivation des dĂ©cisions de la Cour internationale de justice », in H. Ruiz Fabri and J.-M. Sorel, La motivation des dĂ©cisions des juridictions internationales, Paris, Pedone, 2008, pp. 1-90, and in particular pp. 81-90.
118 Military and paramilitary activities, jurisdiction and admissibility, op. cit. p. 434, § 94.
119 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, op. cit. p. 620, § 39.
120 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, op. cit., § 112.
121 I.C.J., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, Reports 2004, p. 178, §§ 105-106; I.C.J., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Reports 1996, p. 239, §§ 24-25.
122 For an analysis of the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law, see. S. Szurek, « Droit international des droits de l’homme et droit international humanitaire : entre guerre et paix », in FrontiĂšres du droit, critique des droits, billets d’humeur en l’honneur de DaniĂšle Lochak, Paris, LGDJ, 2007, pp. 195-199.
123 Georgia and Russia have been parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions since 14 September 1993 and 10 May 1954 respectively. There are no reservations preventing the application of these instruments to the situation.
124 It is true that the complexity of the situation makes it both difficult and fluctuating to define a situation of armed conflict in this case. From the first Russian interventions during the independence phase in the early 1990s to the intervention in the summer of 2008, the history of the region is one of tension between Georgia and its provinces, under the constant and institutionalised surveillance of Russian troops. It is difficult to dispute that the intervention in August 2008 constituted an international armed conflict: Russia intervened, whatever the cause of its intervention, as a State against another sovereign State. The thresholds for the application of humanitarian law had therefore been crossed, if not by the existence of a ‘war’ in the traditional sense of international law, then at least by the occurrence of an ‘armed conflict arising between two or more of the High Contracting Parties’ within the meaning of Articles 2 common to the 1949 Conventions. The existence of an internal armed conflict appears to have been confirmed until the signing of the Sochi agreement (with the Ossetians) on 25 June 1992 and the Moscow agreement (with the Abkhazians) on 14 May 1994. Determining the nature of the situation in the intervening period, i.e. between 1994 and 2008, is more difficult. Conventional humanitarian law is very imprecise and case law, particularly that of the international criminal tribunals, is not very precise on the criteria to be used to identify an internal armed conflict, as distinct from mere « situations of internal tension, internal disturbances, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other similar acts, which are not considered to be armed conflicts » (Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Article 1 § 2). It should simply be noted here that the Georgian question remained on the agenda of the Security Council, which continued, even before the events of 2008, to speak of « separation of forces », « ceasefire » and « conflict » (Resolution 1808, 15 April 2008). There is no doubt that the International Court of Justice will have a difficult task ahead of it when it tries to determine, for each of the moments in the case, whether there is a legal situation of armed conflict giving rise to the application of humanitarian law.