« On 7 May 1919, at precisely 3 a.m., the memorable ceremony of handing over the peace treaty to the German plenipotentiaries took place. The German delegates entered amid an impressive silence. Mr de Brockdorff-Rantzau, visibly pale, bowed and then took his seat, as did his colleagues. M. Georges Clémenceau then declared the session open and, in a firm, clear and trenchant voice, he delivered the following speech:
‘Gentlemen German plenipotentiaries, this is neither the time nor the place for superfluous words; you have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of the small and great powers united in accepting the hardest war that has been cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come for a heavy reckoning. You have asked us for peace; we are at your disposal to grant it. You will receive the book containing our conditions of peace; you will have every opportunity to examine them at your leisure, not to mention the courtesy procedure familiar to all civilised peoples. You will find us eager to assist you in your task, but this second peace of Versailles has been bought too dearly for us not to have the right to demand, by all the means in our power, the legitimate satisfactions which are due to us' »1.
Georges ClĂ©menceau’s speech on the occasion of the presentation to the German delegation of the draft peace treaty drawn up by the Allies overturned certain concepts traditionally associated with this category of instrument. He replaced the image of the vanquished accepting the treaty under duress with that of a vanquished placed in the position of a claimant. The image of a victor who bases his demands on victory is replaced by that of a creditor claiming the ‘right’ to obtain the ‘legitimate’ ‘satisfaction’ that is ‘due’ to him. There can be no doubt that such a discourse has above all a legitimising function, and that the references to legal lexicon have an essentially instrumental function. However, the political nature of the discourse is not enough to rule out its legal validity from the outset. The law is and can only be an instrument in the service of a certain policy2. The fact that this policy is partly determined by considerations of another order in no way precludes the study of the intrinsic value of the legal arguments used. Rather than relegating the diplomat’s legal arsenal to the status of a rhetorical device, it should be taken seriously. This thesis therefore sets out to study the legal foundations that determine both the content and the value of peace treaties.
A legal study
2. A legal study â. The possibility of subjecting the peace treaty to a truly legal study has long been disputed. As long ago as 1871, the author of a long article devoted to the war between France and Germany justified the brevity of his analysis of the peace treaty by pointing out « that many of the considerations by means of which such events are usually assessed belong to politics or international morality rather than to law »3. More generally, « [i]t is a widespread belief that the consequences of war, particularly of major wars, escape strict juridical appraisal »4. The ambiguity of the place accorded to law in discussions on the return to peace is particularly apparent in the discussions prior to the opening of the Congress of Vienna, which followed the upheavals caused in Europe by the wars and the defeat of Napoleon:
« On 8 October 1814, the ambassadors of the great powers met at Metternich’s house. The aim was to announce to Europe the opening of the Congress. They were deliberating on a declaration that it would take place on 1er November. Talleyrand asked that the following words be added: « It will be carried out in accordance with the principles of public law. This proposal caused a storm.
« â No, sir! » said Hardenberg, standing up, his fists clenched, almost threatening. No, sir! Public law is useless.
Mr de Humboldt shouted:
« What is public law doing here?
â That’s why you’re there, » replied Talleyrand.
The two Prussian envoys calmed down. Everyone seemed taken aback.
Why say that we will act according to public law? » observed Hardenberg. That goes without saying.
â If it’s all right not to say it, » Talleyrand replied, « it will be all right to say it.
It was decided that we would say it, because it was impossible to explain why we had initially refused to say it. A few days later, reporting on this scene, Talleyrand wrote: « It is claimed that we have won a victory for having introduced the expression public law. This opinion should give you an idea of the spirit that drives the Congress »5.
The uncertainty surrounding the possibility of a legal analysis of the peace treaty stems from two types of considerations. Some relate to the object of the treaty, others to its form. The former are based on the denial of the legal nature of the dispute between the belligerents, while the latter are based on the denial of the legal nature of a treaty settlement.
The legal nature of the dispute
3. The legal nature of the dispute â. Objections based on the subject matter of the peace treaty are in reality no more than a variation of the theory of non-justiciable disputes, which by their nature or the issues at stake are not susceptible to a strictly legal assessment6. For a time this was the classic view7 , but it is now condemned by both legal doctrine and case law, which are commonly convinced that « every dispute has both legal and political aspects »8. Thus, while it is generally true that « the use of force to settle a dispute renders it ‘political' »9 , the corollary of this assertion is not that the dispute is not subject to a legal analysis. Indeed,
« one never claimed that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve the legal issues between them in the interests of the parties »10.
To be more precise,
« The Court has never shied away from examining a case simply because it had political implications or involved serious elements of the use of force »11.
The question, therefore, is not whether the disputes that peace treaties purport to resolve are political in nature; it is simply a matter of establishing that they do in fact have a legal dimension.
In this respect, it will be accepted that « [t]he existence of a legal dispute is determined by the type of claim put forward and by the nature of the argument supporting it. A dispute will be legal if the claim is based on treaties [âŠ] and other sources of law »12. It is irrelevant at this stage whether the rules relied on are valid and whether they are validly applied to the facts of the case: the existence of doubts in this respect merely attests to the legal nature of the question13. Consequently, there is virtually no dispute that can escape classification as a legal dispute. Indeed, « [u]ltimately, in all dispute in which it is involved a state may rely on rights and obligations stemming from international law, even though they be the most general and imprecise norms »14. The situation is no different when the initial dispute has taken the form of an armed struggle. At the end of a war, as during peacetime, « the parties each have a claim against the other; each of them may rely on principles or norms of international law, even if there is a total divergence of views as to their content, their applicability or even their very existence »15. The most obvious situations of aggression are always based on the assertion of a right, if not positive, at least natural. Thus, to give just a few topical examples, German claims to the Sudetenland in application of the right of peoples16 or Iraq’s claim to Kuwait17. In return, « the consequences of aggression are in themselves comparable to the consequences of any other international wrong »18. The victim is then in a position to make a number of claims against the aggressor based on the aggression and the damage it has caused. At the end of a war, therefore, there exists a set of legal relationships « which it would be false to dismiss cursorily as ‘victor’s justice' »19 and which result in « a relationship between the holder of a right and the debtor of an obligation »20. It is these relationships and their consequences that a legal study of the peace treaty is intended to address.
The legal nature of the settlement
4. The legal nature of the settlement â. Objections to the legal nature of the peace treaty based on the form of the instrument are based on an argument that ultimately has to do with the very definition of law. It is no longer a question of asserting that the dispute is not a legal dispute, but that the way in which it is resolved is not. The complaint is similar to the more general one against international law itself: in the absence of an impartial and disinterested third party, international law is not law21. If law is characterised by the intervention of a third party, what legal status can be given to a conventional method of settlement in which the solution is decided by the parties themselves? Authors who refer to diplomatic negotiation as a dispute resolution method consistently classify it as a « political » method, as opposed to the « legal » methods of judicial or arbitral settlement22. However, this objection is unconvincing, since it is based on an exaggerated conception of the opposition between the political and the legal in dispute resolution. A legal settlement is rarely free of all political considerations, even if it is the work of a judge23. Conversely, a political settlement is never entirely ignorant of the legal rules applicable to the dispute. During negotiations, the parties on both sides put forward legally founded claims. As one commentator on the Westphalia peace negotiations has noted,
« The three bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun had been detached from the Germanic corps and ceded to France during the reign of Henri II [âŠ]. As for Lorraine, [âŠ] it will be retained both as punishment for the Duke’s personal infidelities and as compensation for the costs of the war »24.
It is also significant that in the vast majority of cases the victors refrain from making aberrant demands of the vanquished25. The regularity of this moderation suggests, over and above obvious strategic considerations, the existence of certain « constraints » that do not authorise the parties to do « anything goes »26. Recourse to a conventional form of settlement is therefore no obstacle to valid consideration of the strictly legal factors that determine the outcome, at least to some extent.
Scope and value of a legal study of the peace treaty
5. Scope and value of a legal study of the peace treaty â. The assertion that there are legal issues at the end of a war requires some clarification as to its scope. To say that there are legal relationships at the end of a war and to consider the way in which they are taken into account at the time of the drafting of the peace treaty is in no way to give in to the temptation of a « panjuralism » which, moreover, practice would soon invalidate27. To assert that there are legal relations between the parties at the end of a war does not imply, in the first place, that there are only legal relations: there are undoubtedly many considerations which the law cannot account for28. Nor, secondly, does restricting the study to legal issues imply that the law takes precedence in determining the conditions for a return to peace. Nor, thirdly and lastly, does it suggest that legal considerations should take precedence in the drafting of peace treaties. Without even considering the question from the point of view of values, it is essential to stress, once and for all, that law â and especially international law â in principle has only a suppletive character in relations between its subjects: subject to the imperative nature of certain rules, States are free to dispense with legal prescriptions in favour of solutions that they consider more appropriate. In this sense, law and politics are much less opposed than they interact29. The approach of considering the peace treaty from a legal perspective should not therefore be understood as an attempt to substitute law for politics in conflict resolution. It is simply an attempt to identify and study the legal factors at work in the practice of restoring peace30.
Lack of interest shown by legal scholars
6. The lack of interest shown by legal scholars â. As a legal technique, the peace treaty has long received little attention from legal scholars. It is undoubtedly a truth that transcends disciplines that « [t]he end of conflict has always been less studied than its beginnings »31. There are few legal studies devoted to the peace treaty. Symptomatically, the only author who ventures to assert that « the study of the peace treaty is widely developed » does not accompany his assertion with any notes or bibliographical references32. In fact, « [t]here have been some fine accounts of the negotiated settlement of individual wars [âŠ], but general works on war termination are strikingly scarce »33. It is true that many works have focused on the study of a specific treaty34 or a specific theme35 , or even a specific theme within a specific treaty36. Strictly analytical, these studies could not provide an overall view of the concept of a peace treaty. Other, more general works have considered the peace treaty incidentally, as just one of the various possible forms of return to peace37. Necessarily synthetic, they could only give a summary view38.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, only a few authors attempted to bridge the gap between analysis and synthesis. Their cross-disciplinary studies covered the many aspects of the practice over a long period39. However, despite their richness, these works now suffer in two ways from the period in which they were written. On the one hand, because they were written during the First World War, these works had an exclusively practical purpose, which was to provide negotiators with « some assistance and some warnings for the future Treaty »40. The richness of the analysis is therefore exhausted in a synthesis that is essentially descriptive and indifferent to any attempt at systematisation. It is thus remarkable that, in 1933, a thesis on the subject of Le Traité de Trianon et la théorie des traités de paix (The Treaty of Trianon and the theory of peace treaties) refrains, beyond the title page, from any reference to such a theory, and instead develops a critique based solely on references to a few precedents41. On the other hand, and for the same reason, works written prior to the First World War cannot but ignore the profound transformations that would occur in practice from the end of that conflict, particularly as a result of the increasing restrictions on the use of armed force42.
The subsequent period was not very conducive to new general studies on the subject. The inter-war period saw mainly commentaries on the 1919-1920 treaties, which were often partisan43. At the end of the Second World War, the unprecedented fate of Germany led authors to lose interest in a treaty procedure that they felt was doomed to disappear44 , if not radically incompatible with the new order established by the United Nations Charter45. The emergence of new forms of conflict â colonial conflicts, internal conflicts and other asymmetric conflicts â also seemed to render obsolete a formalism designed to govern relations between sovereign states. Because war has become, contrary to Rousseau’s aphorism, a human-to-human relationship, the study of the conditions for its resolution has become sociological, psychological and anthropological46. The incredible growth of transdisciplinary Peace Studies contrasts with the lack of interest shown by legal scholars in the question of restoring peace47.
Emergence of a jus post bellum
7. The emergence of a jus post bellum â. This lack of interest on the part of jurists in the general problem of the return to peace has recently been called into question by the success of the doctrinal affirmation of a jus post bellum with the same normative texture as jus ad bellum and jus in bello48. The approach, which consists in identifying a body of substantive rules governing the return to peace, echoes earlier attempts in this direction. As early as « [at] the end of the XVIIĂšme century, Henri de Cocceji wrote a dissertation in which he tried to demonstrate that there was a law of victory, a jus victoriae« 49. The jus post bellum is therefore merely « a modern framework for an old idea »50. This idea is based on the assertion that
« t]he regulation of substantive components of peace-making is not merely determined by the discretion and contractual liberty of the warring factions, but is governed by certain norms and standards of international law derived from different fields of law and legal practice »51.
Formulated in this way, jus post bellum is certainly acceptable. However, although it claims the authority of international law, the body of rules thus constituted remains profoundly marked by the considerations and methods of the field of moral philosophy, from which it originates52. Legal studies that take up the concept still very often struggle to distinguish between legal obligations and moral exhortations. In an article published in 2006 in the European Journal of International Law, Carsten Stahn envisages a jus post bellum « translated from a moral principle into a legal notion »53. He gives six principles as examples: « Fairness and Inclusiveness of Peace Settlements », « Demise of the Concept of Punishment for Aggression », « Humanization of Reparations and Sanctions », « Move from Collective Responsibility to Individual Responsibility », « Towards a Combined Justice and Reconciliation Model » and « People-centred Governance »54. It is true that the list is consistent with some of the main trends in contemporary peacemaking practice: certainly, « there is some evidence that the establishment of sustainable peace requires [âŠ] a fair hearing of the interests of all parties to the conflict at the negotiating table »55 ; there is undoubtedly « a [âŠ] trend towards moderation in the treatment of an aggressor [âŠ] in the area of reparations »56 , « a move from collective to individual responsibility »57 and « a trend towards accommodating post-conflict responsibility with the needs of peace in the area of criminal responsibility »58. For all that, it remains very difficult to ensure the transition from the descriptive to the prescriptive, and the normative inductions on which the author claims to establish his principles are particularly fragile. The international rules invoked for this purpose are systematically relieved of the reservations imposed by their interpretation. It is thus difficult to infer from Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties the right of a State â and even more so of non-State entities â to participate in the settlement of a conflict of which they are the instigators59. Similarly, it is difficult to generalise from the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States to a blanket condemnation of sanctions for aggression60. It is even more difficult to deduce from the idea of the prohibition of collective sanctions the need to substitute the responsibility of the individual for that of the State61. Finally, it would appear to be an exaggeration to assert that the return to peace requires « people-centred governance » based on article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights62. Formalising jus post bellum into a body of principles is therefore somewhat premature, and Christine Bell is undoubtedly right to denounce this approach as the unwelcome expression of a « codification instinct »63. In reality, « [t]here is no clear will or capacity to agree a new ‘fifth’ Geneva Convention »64 and « it is unlikely that consensus could be reached on the content of any new regime »65. For the time being, therefore, it remains difficult to see theories of jus post bellum as anything other than the expression of some of the aspirations of doctrine in the field of the return to peace66.
However, the scope of the criticism levelled at this doctrine should not be exaggerated. The reservations expressed about an a priori set of rules governing the return to peace « should not be taken as meaning that post-conflict situations are somehow exempt from the application of international law »67. On the contrary, one of the most fundamental contributions of jus post bellum is the assertion that « [k]ey aspects of the legal relationship between the victors and the defeated are already governed by rules of international law »68. One of the main criticisms that can be levelled at jus post bellum theorists is the excessively axiological nature of their approach, which leads them to confer excessive value on a few selected rules of international law: it is remarkable from this point of view that the six principles set out by Carsten Stahnhave the common feature of imposing restrictions on the victor, without saying anything about the obligations likely to weigh on the vanquished. Basically, the assertion that the return to peace « is governed by certain norms and standards of international law »69 is part of an a priori selectivity whose necessity is not at all obvious. In reality, any rule of international law is likely to be applicable when peace is restored. The determination of the applicable law is the result of individual considerations which cannot be prejudged. Consequently, the legal regime for a return to peace cannot be seen as a static statement of a separate and potentially exclusive body of rules. It must be conceived as a dynamic articulation of rules which cannot be identified a priori and which must be co-ordinated in application of the mechanisms of general international law.
Current issues
8. Current issues â. The renewed interest of legal doctrine in the issue of the return to peace is, in any case, welcome, given that, despite the predictions made at the end of the Second World War, the disappearance of the peace treaty is not imminent. Indeed, the advent of a centralised system of collective security capable of settling peacemaking issues by authoritarian means has not been enough to condemn the use of the agreement technique to put an end to the use of force between states. The number of peace treaties concluded in the fifty years following the establishment of the United Nations is even slightly higher than the number of treaties concluded in the half-century following the Treaties of Westphalia of 164870. It is true that the figure drops significantly if treaties linked to the Second World War are excluded. Nevertheless, the survival of the practice is clearly attested by the treaties of Washington in 197971 , Lima in 198072 , Wadi Araba in 199473 and Algiers in 200074. Looking ahead, there are several indications that the instrument will continue to be used in the years to come. Japan and Russia have recently intensified negotiations with a view to concluding a « peace treaty » designed to resolve issues between the parties that have remained unresolved since the end of the Second World War75. In the same vein, the French National Assembly was recently presented with a « motion for a resolution on the urgent need for a peace treaty in Korea », with a draft agreement to this effect attached76. Similarly, in its resolution 65/16 of 30 November 2010, the United Nations General Assembly for the first time referred to the conclusion of a « peace treaty » between Israel and Palestine77. Moreover, these calls do not appear to contradict positive law. In the TadiÄ case, did not the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia confirm a view long accepted in legal doctrine78 , according to which an international armed conflict ends in principle with « the general conclusion of peace »79 ?.
The vitality of the peace treaty issue is also reflected in the fact that countless peace treaties remain in the contemporary legal order, continuing to form the basis of rights and fuelling disputes that are sometimes referred to the International Court of Justice80. Several recent judgments incorporate provisions borrowed from peace treaties into the Court’s reasoning: for example, the judgments handed down in 2009 between Costa Rica and Nicaragua81 and in 2012 between Germany and Italy82. Bolivia’s recent application to the Court similarly refers to a peace treaty that the applicant concluded with Chile in 1904, the validity of which has already been challenged in the past83. Even if there are no new peace treaties in the future, a study of the legal rules relating to these instruments would still be useful.
9. Beyond the topicality of the question â. In any case, the interest of a study cannot be reduced to the topicality of its subject. There are cases in which the dust is in itself an invitation to re-open the book, both out of historical curiosity and out of a concern to find, in ancient practice, the light of contemporary mechanisms. The peace treaty is of particular interest in this respect84. In fact, the instrument governs various areas of the external life of States and lies at the intersection of various branches of international law, both formal and substantive. By virtue of its long-standing practice, the complexity of its issues and the diversity of concerns that determine its conclusion, the peace treaty has long been regarded by international law as a veritable « normative laboratory »85. The study of peace treaties provides an insight into the way in which international law has dealt with the many tensions that still affect relations between its subjects today: will and constraint; equality and differentiation; sovereignty and obligation; particular interests and the general interest; law and force. Of course,
« It may [âŠ] seem pointless, not to say anachronistic, to take an interest at the beginning of the twenty-first century, at a time of reflection on the transformations of international law linked to the advent of an international community [âŠ] in a legal technique that had its golden age before the First World War and which is therefore associated with a bygone political system »86.
However, Sandrine Barbier is fully convincing when she counters this argument with the assertion that, in such a case, the « primary interest » of the study must be found « precisely in the disaffection of doctrine for this legal technique and, more generally, for the so-called classic mechanisms of international law »87. In the field of peacemaking, recent attempts to formulate a jus post bellum attest to the existence of a doctrinal will to go beyond the classic mechanisms of international law in favour of new theories. This approach is not to be condemned in itself. However, it is only of interest if it can be shown that the classic mechanisms have become incapable of explaining the phenomenon in question. This does not seem to be the case in the field of conventional peacemaking. On the contrary, considering the peace treaty through the mechanisms of general international law allows us to give a fairly precise account of the body of rules that governs it, and thus to determine, simultaneously, its foundation and its limits. The first step in such a study is to define precisely the scope of the analysis, both by outlining the main features of the concept of peace treaty (§ 1) and by defining the geographical and historical limits of the practice under consideration (§ 2). It will then be possible to highlight the difficulties presented by the subject and identify ways of overcoming them (§ 3).
Notes
1 Séance de remise du Traité de Versailles in Traité de Versailles 1919, Paris⊠[67 words hidden]
2 In this sense, at least, legal subjects are not passive recipients of a⊠[80 words hidden]
3 G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, « Essai complémentaire sur la guerre franco-⊠[40 words hidden]
4 A. Gattini, « The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New⊠[41 words hidden]
5 A. Sorel, Essais d’histoire et de critique, E. Plon,⊠[25 words hidden]
6 On this question and its reconsideration, see J. S. Reeves,⊠[331 words hidden]
7 In an article published in 1929, André DecenciÚre-FerrandiÚre gave an account⊠[96 words hidden]
8 A. Pellet, « La force et le rÚglement des différends politiques:⊠[26 words hidden]
9 Ibid, pp. 238239â.
10 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v⊠[41 words hidden]
11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States⊠[44 words hidden]
12 C. Schreuer, « What is a Legal Dispute? », in International Law⊠[38 words hidden]
13 Voltaire in his time mocked the futility and obscurity of the claims that parties⊠[241 words hidden]
14 I. Diaconu, « Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States: History and⊠[61 words hidden]
15 Ibid, p. 1100.
16 On this question, see. G. Louis-Jaray, « Comment⊠[140 words hidden]
17 On this question, see e.g. M. Mendelson⊠[52 words hidden]
18 A. Gattini, « The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New⊠[28 words hidden]
19 Ibid, p. 163.
20 According to Michel Virally, this character is the first of the « elementary⊠[56 words hidden]
21 On the existence of an impartial and disinterested third party as a determining character⊠[81 words hidden]
22 See e.g. Ch. Rousseau, Droit international public, t⊠[32 words hidden]
23 See, more generally, Martti Koskenniemi’s attack on « the idea that international law⊠[53 words hidden]
24 L.-P. Anquetil, Motifs des guerres et des traités de paix⊠[58 words hidden]
25 On this assertion, see the analysis of the respective obligations of the victor⊠[34 words hidden]
26 V. Champeil-Desplats, M. Troper, « Introduction », in⊠[52 words hidden]
27 On this idea, see the warning by J. Carbonnier, Flexible droit⊠[43 words hidden]
28 In this respect, see the historian’s astonishment, if not unease, at⊠[125 words hidden]
29 The instructions to the French ambassadors at the Congress of Westphalia indicate that it⊠[93 words hidden]
30 The approach is thus part of a perspective that recognises that « [l]aw⊠[71 words hidden]
31 S. Audoin-Rouzeau, A. Becker, 14â 18,⊠[25 words hidden]
32 H. Dorandeu, La fin de l’Ă©tat de guerre sans traitĂ© de paix⊠[42 words hidden]
33 P. R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining⊠[34 words hidden]
34 To cite just a few examples: C. G. Fenwick, « ⊠[325 words hidden]
35 Thematic studies of the return to peace often consider the peace treaty only incidentally⊠[230 words hidden]
36 For some examples, see. A. Mérignhac, « Le désarmement,⊠[417 words hidden]
37 See in particular J. Basdevant, Cours de droit international public : questions⊠[93 words hidden]
38 The same applies to articles on peace treaties in certain specialist encyclopaedias, see⊠[101 words hidden]
39 See in particular Ă. Darras, Ătude sur les traitĂ©s de paix,⊠[107 words hidden]
40 W. G. F. Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace⊠[100 words hidden]
41 L. de Otero, La théorie des traités de paix et le traité⊠[29 words hidden]
42 On this development, the significance of which should not be exaggerated, see infra⊠[20 words hidden]
43 For some examples, see C. G. Fenwick, « The Russian⊠[343 words hidden]
44 See H. Dorandeu, La fin de l’Ă©tat de guerre sans traitĂ© de⊠[53 words hidden]
45 Georges Scelle wrote in 1954 that « the new legal technique rules out the⊠[91 words hidden]
46 J.âJ. Rousseau, Du contrat social, Marc-Michel âRey⊠[54 words hidden]
47 For an overview of the breadth of the field of Peace Studies, see⊠[90 words hidden]
48 To mention only the articles with a legal vocation, see in chronological order⊠[601 words hidden]
49 E. Nys, Le droit international â les principes, les thĂ©ories,⊠[74 words hidden]
50 C. Stahn, « Jus ad bellum », « jus in bello »âŠâŠ [28 words hidden]
51 Ibid, p. 937.
52 The hypothesis of a jus post bellum appeared in 1994 when a professor of⊠[152 words hidden]
53 C. Stahn, « Jus ad bellum », « jus in bello »âŠâŠ [28 words hidden]
54 Ibid, pp. 938941â.
55 Ibid, p. 938.
56 Ibid, p. 939.
57 Ibid, p. 940.
58 Ibid, pp. 940-941â.
59 Ibid, p. 938. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention reads as⊠[91 words hidden]
60 Ibid, p. 939.
61 Ibid, p. 940. On this question, see. AâŠ. [72 words hidden]
62 C. Stahn, « Jus ad bellum », « jus in bello »âŠ
⊠[29 words hidden]
63 C. Bell, « Peace settlements and international law: from lex pacificatoria⊠[159 words hidden]
64 Ibid, p. 543.
65 Ibid.
66 The lex pacificatoria envisaged by Christine Bell reveals a more assertive approach from this point⊠[111 words hidden]
67 G. Verdirame, « What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A⊠[28 words hidden]
68 Ibid, p. 309 (emphasis added).
69 C. Stahn, « Jus ad bellum », « jus in bello »âŠâŠ [28 words hidden]
70 The corpus selected for the study includes twenty treaties concluded between 1648 and 1698⊠[104 words hidden]
71 Treaty of Washington, 1979 (Egypt; Israel).
72 Treaty of Lima, 1980 (Honduras; El Salvador).
73 Treaty of Wadi Araba, 1994 (Israel; Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan).
74 Algiers Agreement, 2000 (Eritrea; Ethiopia).
75 The press regularly reports on exchanges between the two states on this subject (see⊠[138 words hidden]
76 Motion for a resolution no 1014 tabled on 2 May 2013 by Mr Jean⊠[38 words hidden]
77 The terminology, new to our knowledge in the context of the peace process⊠[81 words hidden]
78 In reverse chronological order: « [t]he classical and ideal method for⊠[322 words hidden]
79 P.T.I.Y., app, Prosecutor v. Duƥko⊠[48 words hidden]
80 For a fuller account of the use of peace treaties by international courts,⊠[22 words hidden]
81 Dispute concerning navigation and related rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment⊠[59 words hidden]
82 Jurisdictional Immunities of States (Germany v. Italy; Greece (Intervener)),⊠[92 words hidden]
83 Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile),⊠[42 words hidden]
84 See in this regard the remarks of R. Lesaffer (ed.), Peace⊠[47 words hidden]
85 To use the expression popularised in international law by Sandra Szukek (« La lutte internationale⊠[43 words hidden]
86 S. Barbier, La garantie en droit international public : contribution Ă l’Ă©tude⊠[37 words hidden]
87 Ibid.